Nuclear Energy Safety Symposium. Proceedings Report by Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf)

Nuclear Energy Safety Symposium  Proceedings Report
© Academy of Science of South Africa
April 2012
ISBN  978-0-9870160-0-3
Published by:
Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf)
PO Box 72135, Lynnwood Ridge, Pretoria, South Africa, 0040
Tel: +27 12 349 6600 • Fax: +27 86 576 9520
E-mail: admin@assaf.org.za
Reproduction is permitted, provided the source and publisher are appropriately 
acknowledged.
The Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) was inaugurated in May 1996 in 
the presence of then President Nelson Mandela, the Patron of the launch of the 
Academy. It was formed in response to the need for an Academy of Science 
consonant with the dawn of democracy in South Africa: activist in its mission of 
using science for the benefit of society, with a mandate encompassing all fields 
of scientific enquiry in a seamless way, and including in its ranks the full diversity 
of South Africa’s distinguished scientists.
The Parliament of South Africa passed the Academy of Science of South Africa 
Act (Act 67 of 2001), as amended, which came into operation on 15 May 
2002. This has made ASSAf the official Academy of Science of South Africa, 
recognised by government and representing South Africa in the international 
community of science academies.
List of Figures  ........................................................................................5
List of Prefixes ........................................................................................5
List of Units  ........................................................................................5
List of Chemical Elements ...................................................................5
List of Acronyms/Abbreviations .........................................................6
Acknowledgements...........................................................................  7
Welcome and Purpose .......................................................................8
Prof Robin Crewe 
 1.  Disarmament and Global Threat Reduction in the Context 
 of a Growing Nuclear Power Industry.........................................9
 Ms Anne Harrington
2. Nuclear Energy – Understanding Project-related Risks ..........13
 Mr Phumzile Tshelane 
3.  Lessons Learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
 Plant Accident .............................................................................17
 Dr Hideki Nariai 
 4.  Challenges and Opportunities for Enhancing the 
 Safety Standards in the Nuclear Industry .................................24
 Prof Robert Guillaumont 
 5.  Challenges and Opportunities for Enhancing the 
 Development of Safer Nuclear Energy Technologies ............30
 Prof Rob Adam 
6. Nuclear Energy Safety: A Systems Approach .........................34
 Prof Piet Stoker 
 7.  The Role of Regulatory Authorities in Future Nuclear Energy 
 Safety Development ..........................................................................40
 Adv Boyce Mkhize 
8.  Public Engagement and Perceptions of Nuclear Energy 
 and Associated Risks ...................................................................... 44
 Dr Alex Tsela 
 9.  Responsible Stewardship of the Nuclear Renaissance: 
 Best Practice for Non-proliferation ............................................49
 Prof Roger Cashmore 
Table of Contents
 3
Discussion: Selected Questions and Answers ...................................... 54
Summary and Way Forward .................................................................. 58 
Concluding Remarks and Vote of Thanks ........................................... 61 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 - Symposium Programme .................................................. 62 
Appendix 2 - Biographies of Speakers  ................................................. 64
Appendix 3 - Symposium Attendees .................................................... 68
4 
 5
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1:  Nuclear electricity production (bars) and nuclear share (%) of total world 
electricity production (line)  .............................................................................14
Figure 2.2: United States electricity production costs, 1995-2008  .........................15
Figure 3.1:  Location of 11 March 2011 earthquake and nuclear power stations  17 
Figure 3.2: Improvised reactor cooling system  ........................................................21 
Figure 4.1:  Principal safety features of the Generation III European 
  Pressurised Reactor ............................................................................... 25 
Figure 4.2: Main processes in the case of a loss of cooling  ...................................26
Figure 4.3: Fukushima data showing the kinetics of irreversible events  ...............27
Figure 5.1: Generations of nuclear reactors .............................................................32
Figure 6.1: Nuclear energy safety – a systems approach .......................................35 
Figure 8.1: Public acceptance survey in the United States, 1998-2010 ................45 
Figure 8.2: Public acceptance survey, 1995-2011....................................................46 
List of Prefixes
Prefix Symbol Power
milli m 10-3
Kilo k 103
Mega M 106
Giga G 109
Tera T 1012
List of Units 
Unit Symbol Definition
Becquerel Bq International System of Units (SI) derived unit of radioactivity
Cubic centimeter cm3 SI unit of volume 
Curie Ci A non-SI unit of radioactivity 
Sievert Sv Equivalent dose of radiation 
Watt W  SI unit for power 
List Chemical Elements 
Element Symbol
Helium He
Plutonium Pu
Uranium U
6 
List of Acronyms/Abbreviations 
AC Alternating current
ASSAf Academy of Science of South Africa
BWR Boiling water reactor
DST Department of Science and Technology
HPIC High pressure coolant injection 
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IC Isolation condenser
ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection
INCOSE International Council of Systems Engineering
IRP Integrated Resource Plan
Necsa South African Nuclear Energy Corporation 
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NES Nuclear Energy Safety
NGOs Non-governmental organisations 
NIASA Nuclear Industry Association of South Africa
NNR National Nuclear Regulator
NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 
NRB National Regulatory Body
NSS Nuclear Safety Standards 
PUI Peaceful Uses Initiative
PWR Pressurised water reactor 
R&D Research and Development
RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RHR Residual Heat Removal  
SCA Safety Case Analysis 
SE Systems engineering
SRS Stakeholder requirement specification 
TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company
UK United Kingdom
URS User requirement specification
US United States
WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators
WINS World Institute of Nuclear Security
WNA World Nuclear Association 
 
 7
Acknowledgements 
This proceedings report was a collaborative effort involving many people. 
The Academy of Science of South Africa would like to acknowledge the 
following individuals and organisations, in particular:
•	  All the presenters, session chairs and participants who provided their 
valuable input 
•	  Ms Heather Erasmus from WriteConnect for the compilation of the sum-
mary of the symposium
•	  Mr John Walmsely for the compilation and editing of the proceedings 
report
•	 Professor Roseanne Diab for the final edit
•	  The Science Council of Japan and the French Embassy of South Africa 
for funding the attendance of the Japanese and French experts, 
Dr Hideki  Nariai and Professor Robert Guillaumont, respectively
•	  The United States Department of Energy for funding the attendance of 
Ms Anne Harrington
•	  The Embassy of Japan in South Africa/Namibia, the Académie des 
Sciences, Institut de France and the Royal Society, UK for their assistance 
and support
•	  Professor Rob Adam and Ms Ditebogo Kgomo and her team from the 
Department of Energy for their input to the scientific programme
•	 Dr Van Zyl de Villiers for advice and support throughout
•	  Ms Patricia Scholtz, who worked with 3rd I Graphic Design Studio on the 
production of the publication 
•	  Dr Nthabiseng Taole and Ms Henriëtte Wagener and the staff of the 
Academy who contributed to the success of the symposium on which 
this proceedings report is based 
•	  Ms Zarina Moolla, ASSAf Programme Officer who was responsible for 
administrative support to this project, the successful hosting of the sym-
posium and the publication of the proceedings report
NUCLEAR NUCLEAR
8 
Welcome and Purpose   
       
Prof Robin Crewe, 
President, Academy of Science 
of South Africa
Prof Crewe welcomed the participants and representatives of the media to the 
symposium. He introduced the speakers, the chairpersons of the sessions and im-
portant guests including several international participants. He welcomed Mr Toshiro 
Ozawa the Ambassador of Japan, Mr Tshinyadzo Mphephu of the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee on Energy, and Mr Charles Randolph of the US Embassy. He 
apologised on behalf of the Minister of Energy, Ms Dipuo Peters and indicated that 
the programme would be modified to allow for extended discussions.
would be held in South Africa. Discus-
sions regarding the symposium continued 
at an InterAcademy Council meeting in 
Washington DC where an analysis of the 
events that had taken place at Fukushi-
ma in Japan was presented. Represen-
tatives of the Science Council of Japan 
indicated that they would be prepared 
to send a representative to present at this 
symposium. 
The idea of the symposium had been en-
dorsed by the ASSAf Council. The ASSAf 
staff had organised the event and were 
commended for having mobilised inter-
national partners, as well as a variety of 
South African stakeholders to participate 
in this exchange of ideas. It was coin-
cidental that the Royal Society’s report 
was due to be released in London on the 
same day as the symposium. Prof Roger 
Cashmore had agreed to participate via 
a video link in order to present a brief 
overview of the report to participants at 
the symposium.
The topic for the 2011 annual sympo-
sium arose from a discussion between 
ASSAf and the Deputy Minister of Science 
and Technology (DST) towards the end 
of 2010. ASSAf had been requested to 
prepare a commentary on the Integrated 
Resource Plan (IRP) 2010. ASSAf presen-
ted the commentary to the DST early in 
2011. Copies of the commentary were 
available to participants. Subsequently, 
Prof Crewe had attended the G8+5 
Academies of Science meeting in Paris, 
where the idea of holding a symposium 
on nuclear energy safety in South Africa 
was initiated. It was deemed desirable to 
invite a number of international guests 
to participate in the symposium in order 
to get an international view of the issues 
raised in relation to nuclear energy safe-
ty. A representative of the Royal Society 
(UK), who was also present at the meet-
ing in Paris, indicated that the Royal So-
ciety was due to complete a report on 
nuclear energy that would be released 
around the time that the symposium 
NUCLEAR NUCLEAR
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Disarmament and Global Threat 
Reduction in the Context of a Growing 
Nuclear Power Industry
Ms Anne M Harrington, 
Deputy Administrator for Defence Nuclear Non-proliferation, National 
Nuclear Security Administration, US Department of Energy 
Prospects for Nuclear Energy 
Current forecasts suggest that the world 
will see an increase in global energy con-
sumption of over 50 per cent by 2030. Of 
this growth in demand, 70 per cent is ex-
pected to come from developing coun-
tries.
The March 2011 events at the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant have neces-
sitated a review of nuclear power plant 
safety and operations. Many countries 
have already signalled their intention to 
proceed with plans to engage with a nu-
clear future. There are many reasons for 
this: nuclear power can play a significant 
and expanding global role in promoting 
economic growth, reducing carbon pol-
lution, and satisfying the world’s increasing 
demand for base load electricity.
Globally, nuclear energy is undergoing re-
newed growth with 65 new reactors under 
construction in 15 countries. In the United 
States (US), a renewed interest in nuclear 
energy has resulted in blueprints for the first 
new nuclear power plants in over 30 years. 
Licence applications have been submit-
ted to construct 26 new nuclear reactors 
in the US.
In the US, nuclear energy provides about 
20 per cent of total electricity, but 70 per 
cent of the country’s carbon-free elec-
tricity. In addition, nuclear power plants 
do not release air pollutants, providing 
an important option for improving air 
quality. Globally, nuclear power plants 
supply 14 per cent of the world’s elec-
tricity. Fifteen countries rely on nuclear 
energy to supply at least a quarter of 
their total electricity. Nuclear power 
plants are flexible and very reliable. In 
the US, nuclear power is regarded as 
an essential element of the 21st century 
energy mix, together with renewable 
energy sources.
It is difficult to have any conversation on 
nuclear energy without referring to the 
events of March 2011 in Japan. The risks 
associated with nuclear power are now 
better appreciated and have given rise 
to a healthy global debate. The lessons 
learned from the Fukushima disaster pre-
sent opportunities for numerous studies 
and the involvement of academic organi-
sations such as science academies. For 
example, the roles and integration of mul-
tiple systems is an issue that merits serious 
exploration. Safety features are an inte-
gral part of a power plant’s design. 
NUCLEAR NUCLEAR
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Typically, once a plant is built, the securi-
ty, safeguards and emergency response 
elements are layered on top of the basic 
design. The lack of systems integration 
creates a situation where key emergency 
response organisations in the community 
do not have a full understanding of one 
another’s functions or of how the various 
systems interact. This is a great challenge 
that requires industry, regulatory bod-
ies, non-proliferation experts and others 
to develop a habit of cooperation and 
communication from project inception 
to operation.
Safeguarding Nuclear Material 
In addition to natural events that can 
cause problems at nuclear power plants, 
it is also necessary to consider the poten-
tial theft or diversion of nuclear material. 
Since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, in 
which 46 nations, as well as the European 
Union (EU), participated, considerable 
progress has been made in securing the 
world’s most vulnerable nuclear materials, 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium. 
South Africa has helped lead the way in 
this effort. 
Increased commerce in nuclear mate-
rials is anticipated as a result of the ex-
pansion of nuclear energy generation. 
As a growing number of power plants 
require fuel, uranium will have to be en-
riched and fabricated into fuel that may 
have to be transported some distance 
to reach power plants. Used fuel must ei-
ther be stored securely in the country in 
which it was used, or it may be shipped 
back to the country of origin. Some coun-
tries may choose to reprocess used fuel, 
introducing another set of complica-
tions. An increased demand for uranium 
and its increased value as a commodity 
could raise interest in trafficking in raw 
materials, necessitating more attention to 
mine security and a better understand-
ing of how to ‘fingerprint’ the sources of 
uranium. The nuclear renaissance could 
begin to pose a new series of challenges, 
particularly in relation to security. These 
issues will have to be addressed before 
new nuclear power plants are designed 
and constructed. 
The IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI)
One of the most appropriate means 
of dealing with some of the challenges 
is through the central role of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
The PUI provides technical support to 
countries that are planning to develop 
nuclear energy. It concerns itself with the 
creation of the infrastructure needed to 
support safe and secure custodianship of 
nuclear technology and with the devel-
opment of other areas of nuclear tech-
nology, such as its application to health, 
agriculture and hydrology. It was evident 
in the bilateral discussion at the recent 
IAEA General Conference that the PUI 
has become very popular and, to date, 
has benefited over 100 member states. 
One of its most important aspects is that 
it allows countries, particularly first-time 
entrants into the nuclear industry, to be-
gin planning the development of their 
nuclear power infrastructure. South Africa 
has a role to play in this regard, as a re-
gional leader in Africa. 
The International Framework for Nuclear 
Energy Cooperation provides a venue for 
countries to converse about and address 
non-proliferation issues. It also seeks to ex-
plore mutually beneficial approaches to 
NUCLEAR NUCLEAR
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ensure that the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy proceeds in an efficient manner, 
meeting the highest standards of safety, 
security and non-proliferation. Such con-
versations are an important part of the nu-
clear renaissance and an important way 
of ensuring the safety and security of the 
renaissance. 
The National Nuclear Security Administra-
tion (NNSA), as well as other parts of the 
US Department of Energy, work together 
with other US government and interna-
tional partners, such as the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission and the IAEA, to help 
countries develop the nuclear infrastruc-
ture necessary for the safe and secure 
expansion of nuclear energy. Through 
an extensive network of laboratories and 
universities, NNSA facilitates technical en-
gagement projects with countries at all 
stages of nuclear development. 
Africa will also have newcomers to nu-
clear energy. As a country with advanced 
nuclear technology and the associated 
expertise, South Africa can play a crucial 
role in the continent’s secure nuclear fu-
ture. It is also expected that the planned 
expansion of the G8 Global Partnership 
will allow many more countries to partici-
pate in this process. This mechanism may 
prove to be very useful in the develop-
ment of cooperation and collaboration 
in relation to nuclear and radiological 
security.
Infrastructure development and capac-
ity building are major elements that will 
help address the security issue. They are 
supported and affirmed by:
•	  The IAEA Milestones document which 
aims to help member states under-
stand the commitments and obliga-
tions associated with a nuclear power 
programme. 
•	 The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit.
NNSA is engaging with 17 bilateral and re-
gional partners on 94 different projects to 
improve capabilities for nuclear materials 
control and accounting. 
South Africa 
South Africa can play an important lea-
dership role in many areas in the region. 
NNSA is very proud of the effort carried 
out with South Africa to convert its re-
search reactor for the production of medi-
cal isotopes from highly enriched uranium 
to low-enriched uranium. Together we 
demonstrated that it is possible to con-
vert reactors without affecting the tech-
nical capacity or losing the commercial 
production of the reactor. An important 
contribution to this effort was a study by 
the US National Academy of Sciences on 
the conversion of reactors, particularly for 
the production of molybdenum-99 medi-
cal isotopes. Based on the study, NNSA 
launched discussions with a number of 
countries. To date, the greatest progress 
has been made with South Africa, which 
now leads the way globally in demon-
strating the technical and commercial 
feasibility of such a conversion. This is an 
important example of how countries can 
work together to address security issues 
by limiting the use of highly enriched ura-
nium while supporting the commercial 
activities of the nation. 
The nuclear renaissance environment 
presents some unique opportunities. This 
NUCLEAR NUCLEAR
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is the beginning of a long process that 
will require a great deal of collaboration 
and interaction. In terms of uranium be-
coming an important asset in the future, 
one of the ways to keep track of assets 
is through the emerging field of nuclear 
forensics involving material characteri-
sation and analysis. As uranium increas-
ingly becomes a traded commodity, it 
will be useful to track it at its elemental 
level and to be able to identify its origin. 
NNSA is undertaking a project with the 
IAEA which involves the development 
of security guidelines for uranium min-
ing and the development of basic foren-
sic capabilities in countries around the 
world. There is the possibility of a global 
network of laboratories that have fun-
damental capabilities in uranium char-
acterisation and the development of 
databases to identify the sources of 
uranium. With the IAEA taking a lead 
role in this area, South Africa, which is 
fortunate to have an organisation like 
the South African Nuclear Energy Cor-
poration (Necsa), is poised to become a 
regional leader in the emerging field of 
nuclear forensics.
In conclusion, the potential impact of 
the expansion of nuclear energy on dis-
armament and threat reduction efforts 
should not be ignored. Action to miti-
gate the potential impact should be 
taken now, before uranium is mined and 
power plants are constructed. Working 
with the IAEA and in partnerships with 
other countries, a substantial contribu-
tion can be made to promoting peace-
ful uses of nuclear technology while mini-
mising related risks. 
NUCLEAR NUCLEAR
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Introduction 
Global nuclear electricity production has 
increased steadily since the early 1970s 
and has remained at around 2 500 Twh 
over the past few years (Figure 2.1). The 
nuclear share of total world electricity 
production increased sharply in the 1970s 
and 1980s, dropping off slightly to about 
14 per cent in 2009. 
South African energy demand has also 
followed international trends, and with the 
commitment to reduce the carbon foot-
print, it is clear that South Africa will have 
to use nuclear energy to produce electri-
city; however, there are some challenges 
in terms of deploying nuclear technology 
to produce the projected 9.6 GW of elec-
tricity for South Africa. These challenges 
are the focus of this presentation. 
The South African government approved 
the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2010, 
which provides for the production of 9.6 
GW of electricity from nuclear energy by 
2030. The IRP envisages that the first nu-
clear plant will be commissioned in 2023. 
This is an ambitious, yet achievable, target 
that demonstrates South Africa’s willing-
ness and determination to develop clean 
energy, including nuclear power, and 
also displays trust in nuclear technology. 
There is renewed global interest in nuclear 
energy and the key drivers are:
•	  its contribution to the country’s ener-
gy security of supply; 
•	  improved nuclear economics in terms 
of operation;
•	  environmental advantages, particu-
larly low carbon emissions; 
•	  a very good safety record since the 
Chernobyl disaster, with the Fukushima 
accident demonstrating the high level 
of safety, as the disaster was largely 
outside the nuclear power plant. 
       
Project Risks
The key risks in undertaking a nuclear new 
build project relate to regulatory, finance 
issues, the localisation of manufacture, 
the project schedule, availability of skills 
in a variety of technical fields and pub-
lic acceptance. These risks can manifest 
positively or negatively, as some of the 
risks can present real opportunities. 
The key elements of a nuclear new 
build project are the following: site char-
acterisation, plant procurement and 
contracting, licensing, technology and 
design, financing and execution. Effec-
tive planning around these elements will 
result in the successful deployment of the 
nuclear power plants. Experience has 
Nuclear Energy – 
Understanding Project-related Risks
Mr Phumzile Tshelane, 
Vice-President, Nuclear Industry Association of South Africa (NIASA)  
2
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shown that disruptions related to time, 
work schedule and projected cost over-
runs are common in large power projects. 
Risks therefore must be identified and the 
necessary mitigation measures must be 
built into the planning. Site characterisa-
tion risks should be continuously appraised 
and reviewed frequently to ensure effec-
tive management.
  
The national regulatory framework has 
to support the nuclear power environ-
ment and should be well understood in 
order to minimise risks. It is important to 
secure qualified nuclear sites and avoid 
encroaching of housing developments 
around those identified nuclear sites. A 
legitimate stakeholder engagement pro-
cess must be undertaken to ensure that 
the public is well informed about the nu-
clear power project. 
The type of contracts will affect the costs 
and project schedule, and care should 
therefore be taken to enter into appropri-
ate procurement contracts. Vast invest-
ment is needed in order to secure nuclear 
power plants and to commit to building a 
fleet of power plants. Such commitment 
requires confidence and stability, close as-
sociation with government, and the expe-
rience of a large utility. 
The levelised cost of nuclear power gen-
eration is competitive in comparison to 
other forms of low carbon energy tech-
nologies, but nuclear power has the addi-
tional advantages of providing a reliable 
base load power and also being a fully 
proven electricity generation technology 
in terms of supply reliability. 
Most nuclear power plants operating to-
day were financed and built in a regula-
ted environment, thus they are guaran-
teed future customers and tariff stability, 
while ensuring a profitable rate of return. 
The successful financing of nuclear con-
struction is highly dependent on the pro-
ject structure with the lowest possible 
financing costs. A large part of govern-
ment’s role in nuclear power financing is 
to reduce finance risks. Political risk is a 
major concern for investors and lenders. 
Stable and efficient regulatory and tax 
regimes are essential elements of politi-
cal stability. The extended construction 
period of between 42 and 60 months can 
lead to very high interest costs. 
1 (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf01.html)
Figure 2.1: Nuclear electricity production (bars) and nuclear share (per cent) 
of total world electricity production (line)1 
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The nuclear power plant chosen should 
be of proven technology and established 
design. Key licensing issues should be iden-
tified and resolved prior to construction. 
An efficient and auditable design change 
process must be put in place to ensure ex-
act replica nuclear plants, compliant with 
regulations. The Fukushima Daiichi incident 
has brought about increased awareness 
and understanding of the earthquake 
and tsunami risk to be factored into the 
seismic design and qualification of build-
ings.
The operating performance of nuclear 
energy has shown improvement interna-
tionally, with an increased share of total 
electricity production from nuclear en-
ergy. The cost of electricity production 
from nuclear energy (excluding the cost 
of capital) in the United States (US) has 
decreased slightly, while electricity pro-
duction from oil and gas have increased 
substantially in the US between 1995 and 
2008 (Figure 2.2). 
Licensing
The nuclear industry has come to recog-
nise that it can contribute to stability and 
smoothness in the regulatory process by 
achieving greater constancy in reactor 
designs. The new approach moves all 
design, technical, regulatory and licen-
sing issues to the beginning of the licensing 
process. Safety and environmental issues 
must be fully addressed before construc-
tion begins and before any significant 
capital spending takes place. Strictly de-
fined timeframes should be enforced for 
public hearings and consultations in order 
to avoid delays caused by the public in-
terventions. Adequate staffing of the Na-
tional Nuclear Regulator (NNR) is impor-
tant to ensure timely decisions.
In terms of procurement and contracting, 
the vendor must understand and take na-
tional regulatory practice seriously in order 
to ensure smooth progress of the project. 
Vigilance is required in order to minimise 
risks during the construction phase. These 
2 http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/reliableandaffordableenergy/graphicsandcharts/
uselectricityproductioncosts/) 
Figure 2.2: United States electricity production costs 1995-20082 
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risks should be covered by contractual 
arrangements and should be shared be-
tween the parties involved. Major com-
ponents must be ordered several years 
in advance. The lack of suitably qualified 
and experienced personnel to support 
the nuclear programme is a very critical 
issue.
Risks related to project execution include 
costly delays due to problems with de-
sign, equipment supply, project manage-
ment, construction and commissioning. 
New construction and manufacturing 
methodologies, such as modularisation, 
can help to limit project risks. Effective 
project management and diligent con-
tract management are essential. Opera-
tions can benefit from the sharing of in-
formation and technical assistance with 
professional associations such as the 
World Association of Nuclear Operators 
(WANO). Decommissioning, waste and 
spent fuel must be managed within a 
sound regulatory framework.
Conclusion
It is clear that the drivers for nuclear power 
are strong, particularly in terms of reducing 
carbon emissions. There are opportunities 
for local suppliers to join the international 
supply chain in the procurement of tech-
nology for nuclear new build. Standardi-
sation of reactor design requirements 
contributes to increasing safety and stabili-
sation of the economics. Industry needs 
to cooperate in areas of common interest 
and maintain strong performance in terms 
of safety and economics. Most important-
ly, leadership by government is critical to 
the successful planning, construction and 
operation of nuclear power plants.
NUCLEAR NUCLEAR
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the fourth largest ever recorded and be-
yond the scope of recent seismological 
assumption. The earthquake struck north-
eastern Japan at 14:46 on 11 March 
2011. Several waves of a large tsunami 
hit the coast of the Tohoku and Kanto 
area of Japan between 40 minutes and 
one hour after the first earthquake, killing 
more than 15 000 people. Close to 4 000 
people are still missing. The earthquake 
and the ensuing tsunami led to the acci-
dent at Fukushima. 
In Japan, nuclear energy accounts for al-
most 30 per cent of the country’s total 
electricity production. Prior to the Fuku-
shima accident, Japan had 54 opera-
tional nuclear reactors: 30 boiling water 
Lessons Learnt from the 
Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant Accident
Prof Hideki Nariai,  
Science Council of Japan   
3
Earthquake and Tsunami, 
11 March 2011
Japan suffered a great disaster when 
a large earthquake and tsunami hit its 
north-east coast on 11 March 2011. These 
natural events caused a severe accident 
affecting three reactors at the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power station. Japan is in 
the process of recovering from the disas-
ter, and it is now possible to look back at 
the lessons learnt from the accident.
Japan is located off the east coast of 
Asia, facing the Pacific Ocean. The epi-
centre of the earthquake was located 
near the deep oceanic trench along 
the east coast of Japan (Figure 3.1). The 
earthquake, with a magnitude 9.0, was 
Higashidori NPS
Epicentre
Onagawa NPS
Fukushima Daiichi NPS
Fukushima Daini NPS
Tokia Daini NPS
Figure  3.1: Location of 11 March 2011 earthquake and nuclear power stations
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reactors (BWRs) and 24 pressurised water 
reactors (PWRs). In the affected area, 15 
BWR plants were in operation. Most of 
them were brought to cold shutdown 
status within several days of the natural 
events. However, the tsunami caused fuel 
meltdown of three reactors in the Fukushi-
ma Daiichi Station.
Fukushima Daiichi is one of the oldest 
nuclear power stations in Japan. The first 
plant, Unit 1, was constructed by General 
Electric, and commissioned in March 1971. 
Additional reactors, Units 2 to 6, were con-
structed in sequence by Toshiba and Hita-
chi under contract from General Electric. 
The last (Unit 6) was commissioned in Oc-
tober 1979. At the time of the March 2011 
earthquake, three of these plants were 
operating.  The other three had been shut 
down for periodic inspection. The six units 
differed in terms of reactor model, con-
tainment types and electric outputs and 
had undergone improvements over time.
Accident Sequence
The three operating plants (Units 1, 2 and 
3) were shut down automatically on au-
tomatic detection of the earthquake. 
As all external electric power was lost as 
a result of the earthquake, emergency 
diesel power generators started up in or-
der to power the cooling system used to 
cool down the heated fuel assemblies. The 
10 m retaining seawall could not prevent 
the 15 m tsunami waves from hitting the 
plants, thus disabling the emergency die-
sel generators needed to cool the reactors 
1 to 3 and the used fuel in the Unit 4 fuel 
pool. All alternating current (AC) power 
was lost, as well as the ultimate heat sink. 
Only one emergency diesel generator 
was functioning in Units 5 and 6. The cool-
ing systems for Units 1 to 3 had not func-
tioned for some time when the most se-
vere condition for nuclear power plants, 
the heat-up and meltdown of the fuel, 
occurred.
The Unit 1 reactor was immediately shut 
down (scrammed) by the earthquake, 
and the two emergency diesel generators 
started up. The isolation condenser (IC) 
automatically started in order to cool the 
fuel assemblies but was stopped manually 
because the cooling rate was too high. 
After the IC was stopped, a large wave 
from the tsunami hit the plant and the 
emergency diesel generators stopped 
working. All AC power was lost and the 
reactor fuel could not be cooled. The ulti-
mate heat sink was also lost. The temper-
ature of the fuel rose, thus generating hy-
drogen by the zirconium-water reaction. 
It is estimated that the fuel started to melt 
on the evening of 11 March almost four 
hours after the tsunami struck the plant.
A considerable amount of melted fuel 
moved to and accumulated in the bot-
tom of the reactor pressure vessel. The bot-
tom of the pressure vessel was damaged 
and some of the molten fuel leaked out 
and accumulated on the dry well floor. 
Wet well venting was carried out because 
of the increased pressure in the contain-
ment vessel. A hydrogen explosion then 
occurred in the reactor building, destroy-
ing the structure. 
The process of Unit 2 followed the same 
sequence as Unit 1, the only difference 
being that the reactor core isolation cool-
ing system (RCIC) functioned for three 
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days in Unit 2. A feed and bleed opera-
tion was conducted. Feeding water into 
the reactor with the RCIC led to a rise of 
steam pressure and steam was exhaus-
ted into the water of the suppression 
pool. The temperature of the suppres-
sion pool increased to almost saturation 
and gradually steam could no longer be 
condensed. The fuel assemblies were ex-
posed and, on the evening of 14 March, 
the core started melting. Molten fuel ac-
cumulated at the bottom of the reactor 
vessel. A containment vent procedure 
was prepared but a sound of an explo-
sion occurred during the morning of 15 
March. There is a possibility that an ex-
plosion occurred around the torus room 
of the containment vessel, but the buil-
ding was not destroyed.
Unit 3 followed the same sequence as 
Unit 2. The RCIC functioned but stopped 
at about noon on 12 March. The High 
Pressure Coolant Injection system (HPCI) 
started automatically but then stopped 
on the afternoon of 13 March. After six 
hours the fuel was exposed and started 
melting. The melted fuel accumulated 
at the bottom of the pressure vessel, and 
the wet well vent was carried out. A hy-
drogen explosion occurred in the Unit 
3 reactor building, destroying the struc-
ture.
Unit 4 reactor was shut down for perio-
dic inspection when the earthquake and 
tsunami struck. The nuclear fuel had been 
transferred to the spent fuel pool. Both 
the cooling and feed water functions for 
the fuel pool were lost. An explosion oc-
curred in the reactor building on the morn-
ing of 15 March. It is thought that there 
had been an inflow of hydrogen from Unit 
3 as the Unit 3 vent line joined the vent line 
from Unit 4 upstream of the common ex-
haust stack. 
Water was injected to cool the reactor 
cores of Units 1 to 3 and also to cool the 
spent fuel pools of Units 1 to 4. A large 
amount of water was injected into the 
reactor cores even though it was leak-
ing outside the containment vessel. The 
leaked water accumulated in reactor 
buildings and turbine buildings. Highly 
contaminated water accumulated in the 
power cables pit near the intake channel 
and flowed into the sea. The outflow was 
halted by stopping the discharge process 
and a silt barrier was installed. 
The sequence of events relating to the 
other 11 reactors including Fukushima Dai-
ichi Units 5 and 6 was as follows.
•	  The operation or otherwise of the ex-
ternal AC power supply, the emer-
gency diesel generators and the re-
sidual heat removal system (RHR) was 
crucial for the plants’ ability to reach 
cold shutdown status, thereby playing 
an important role in the outcome of 
the accident. 
•	  Onagawa Units 2 and 3, and Fuku-
shima Daini Unit 3 reached cold shut-
down status on 12 March because 
the external AC power, RHR, RCIC 
and other cooling systems functioned 
correctly, although a temporary ca-
ble had to be installed to run the RHR 
in Fukushima Daini units 1, 2 and 4 to 
reach cold shutdown status on 14 or 
15 March. 
•	  The external AC power supply was lost 
in two of the operating plants, Ona-
gawa Unit 1 and Tokai Daini but the 
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emergency diesel generators and 
RHR functioned correctly. The two 
plants reached cold shutdown status 
on 12 and 15 March respectively.
•	  The external AC power supply did 
not work at the three plants that had 
been temporarily closed for periodic 
inspection. Fukushima Daiichi Units 5 
and 6 reached cold shutdown sta-
tus on 20 March with the use of the 
emergency diesel generator and the 
RHR system. The situation with regard 
to the Higashidori Unit was not seri-
ous, as the fuel assemblies were out-
side the reactor. 
Evacuation of Residents
In terms of the emergency response to 
the accident and the evacuation of resi-
dents in the Fukushima area, the Tokyo 
Electric Power Company (TEPCO) rec-
ognised that the injection of water via 
the emergency core cooling systems was 
problematic at Units 1 and 2. On the eve-
ning of 11 March, TEPCO notified the gov-
ernment of the need to declare a state 
of nuclear emergency in accordance 
with the special law of emergency pre-
paredness for nuclear disasters. Sub-
sequently, the Japanese Prime Minister 
declared a state of nuclear emergency 
and established national and local nu-
clear emergency response headquar-
ters. At 21:30 on 11 March, an evacua-
tion area was established within a 3-km 
radius. The stay-in-house (‘sheltered’) 
area was established within a 3 to 10-km 
radius. 
As a result of the escalation of events, 
the evacuation area was extended to a 
20-km radius on the evening of 12 March. 
The stay-in-house area was extended to 
a 30-km radius on 15 March. Additional 
evacuation areas were established at 
a later stage. Evacuation and stay-in-
house instructions were promptly carried 
out in a concerted effort by residents, 
local government, police and other 
authorities. About 78 000 people were 
evacuated from the vicinity of the power 
plant. Residents will only be able to return 
to their homes when the environment 
has recovered from the nuclear disaster. 
Most importantly, radioactive concen-
trations in the soil and concentrations of 
radioactive materials in the air have to 
be controlled. The soil and environment 
must be decontaminated and recov-
ered. The tedious decontamination pro-
cess had already begun. 
Recovery Plan
On 17 April, TEPCO announced a road-
map for the restoration and recovery 
from the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident 
involving the stabilisation of the reactors 
and spent fuel pools and the mitigation 
of the release of radioactive materials. 
Every effort was to be made to enable 
evacuees to return to their homes and 
for safety and security to return to the lives 
of all citizens. The restoration roadmap 
set two targets, namely: 
•	  The steady decrease of levels of ra-
diation to reach normalisation within 
a period of three months.
•	  The controlled release of radioactive 
materials and cooling of reactors to 
bring them to cold shutdown and so 
significantly curtail the radiation dose 
within a further period of three to six 
months. 
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In order to achieve these targets, sev-
eral activities had to be carried out, the 
most important of which were:
•	  fuel cooling by minimum water injec-
tion; 
•	  transfer of accumulated water in the 
basement of the turbine buildings into 
temporary tanks and the installation 
of a circulation-type water purification 
system;
•	  construction of a cover for the de-
stroyed reactor building. 
On 19 July 2011, TEPCO announced that 
the first target had been accomplished. 
The temperature at the bottom of the 
reactor pressure vessels had been main-
tained at 100–120ºC and by the end of 
September 2011 had fallen below 100ºC. 
Radiation dose-rates had declined and 
the external dose-rate at the site boundary 
was approximately 1.7 mSv/y (millisievert 
per year) at most and was continuing to 
decrease. In terms of the second target, 
the release of radioactive materials was 
under control, and the radiation dose 
was significantly reduced. 
The large amount of contaminated 
water in the turbine buildings and in the 
pits presented a major problem. In order 
to re-use the decontaminated water 
for cooling of the reactor core, a water 
processing facility had been constructed 
and was in operation, producing almost 
90 000 tons of processed water by the 
end of September 2011 (Figure 3.2).
Measures taken in respect of Fukushima 
Daiichi Units 1 to 4 included:
•	  Reactor cooling by circulating water 
via the turbine hall basement along 
with the treatment of high-level radio-
active wastewater.
•	  Spent fuel cooling using a heat ex-
changer.
•	  The installation of a ground water bar-
rier wall to mitigate contamination of 
the sea through underground water.
•	  Installation of covers over the highly 
damaged reactor buildings in order 
to prevent further release of radioac-
tive materials.
•	  The cover of the Unit 1 reactor buil-
ding underway. 
Figure 3.2: Improvised reactor cooling system 
(Source: TEPCO Press Release, 2011)
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Lessons Learnt
The Japanese government reported on 
the lessons learnt from the accident to 
the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nu-
clear Safety. The 28 lessons are divided 
into the following five categories:
 Category 1: 
Strengthening preventive 
measures against a severe accident. 
 The reactors should be sufficiently pro-
tected to avoid serious accidents re-
sulting from natural disasters such as 
earthquakes and tsunamis. Although the 
reactors and major equipment survived 
the earthquake, the external power sup-
ply was damaged. The design guideline 
should take into account the loss of AC 
power over a longer period. An alterna-
tive water injection system should take 
into account the lack of power and a 
high-radiation environment. 
Category 2: 
Enhancement of response 
measures against severe accidents.  
Countermeasure for hydrogen explosion 
outside the reactor containment vessel, 
not only inside the vessel, should be 
considered in the design.
 Category 3: 
Enhancement of nuclear emergency 
response to nuclear disasters.
To provide for large-scale natural disasters 
and protracted nuclear accidents.
 Category 4: 
Strengthening of safety infrastructure, 
specifically the legal framework and 
safety regulatory bodies.  
Provision of criteria and guidelines and 
adequate human resources. Several as-
pects regarding safety have not been 
enough in Japan. Research in relation to 
severe accidents has decreased grad-
ually in these ten years.
Category 5: 
Thoroughly instil a culture of safety.  
It is anticipated that the Fukushima acci-
dent will inspire a new culture of nuclear 
safety.
The government initiated an investiga-
tion into the following matters to imple-
ment the lessons learnt: 
•	  An overall safety evaluation of the 
robustness of existing nuclear power 
plants, particularly safety during, or as 
a result of, natural disasters, including 
loss of all AC power and the ultimate 
heat sink. The evaluation should iden-
tify potential weaknesses in the plants 
by assessing safety margins relating to 
external events.
•	  The revision of safety design guidelines 
such as guidelines relating to seismic 
safety and severe accidents.
•	  The reorganisation of the regulatory bo-
dies at the Ministry of the Environment 
would be completed by April 2012.
The Investigation Committee on the Ac-
cident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power 
Station was established and tasked to 
perform a comprehensive investigation 
to identify the root causes of the acci-
dent. The committee has already held 
three meetings and an intermediate re-
port will be made available at the end 
of 2011. A final report will be produced in 
summer 2012.
Some fundamental points concerning 
the accident are:
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•	  The first nuclear power plants in Japan 
were introduced from the US as part 
of turnkey contracts with GE (BWRs) 
and Westinghouse (PWRs). The US 
companies developed the BWR and 
PWR systems by conducting research 
and development (R&D), including 
numerous fundamental experiments. 
Although Japan had started nuclear 
research in 1954, it lacked basic R&D 
experience, particularly with regard to 
the treatment of radioactive material 
and emergency conditions.
•	  The first plant was planned and con-
structed more than 40 years ago be-
fore extensive knowledge of earth-
quakes and tsunamis was available. 
Scientists at that time said that the 
highest tsunami would be almost 2 
to 3 m and the plant was designed 
and constructed accordingly. 
•	  The complicated systems of nuclear 
power plants require expertise and co-
operation from the broad field of tech-
nology. 
•	  The fact that Japan is a highly deve-
loped, industrial country enabled it to 
manage the accident. A strong scien-
tific and technological base is essen-
tial in order for a country to cope in 
times of disaster. 
The accident was extremely severe and 
had serious consequences. Many impor-
tant lessons have been learnt. These must 
be shared with the international commu-
nity in order to contribute to the enhance-
ment of nuclear safety around the world. 
Japan would like to express sincere grati-
tude for the international support re-
ceived during this disaster. The assistance 
provided by South Africa, particularly the 
rescue teams who participated in the 
search and recovery exercise after the 
disaster, is highly appreciated.
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Nuclear Safety Standards 
The International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy’s (IAEA’s) Nuclear Safety Standards 
(NSS) are documents of fundamental prin-
ciple designed to ensure that nuclear 
safety objectives are achieved. NSSs can 
be advisory or compulsory and are nor-
mally laid down by an advisory or a re-
gulatory body in the country concerned. 
Nuclear safety objectives are expressed 
in general terms and are not concerned 
with specific methods of implementation. 
Most of the IAEA’s NSS are not legally bind-
ing but are considered to be international 
references (as are the recommendations 
of the International Commission on Ra-
diological Protection) for radioprotection 
leading to basic safety standards. The or-
ganisation of nuclear safety depends on 
the sovereignty of each country. There is 
no international nuclear safety authority. 
The World Association of National Opera-
tors (WANO) aims to enhance nuclear 
safety worldwide. International organisa-
tions (for example Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development 
Nuclear Energy Agency and IAEA) and 
transnational organisations (European 
Nuclear Safety Regulators Group, Western 
European Nuclear Regulators Association 
and Heads of the European Radiological 
Protection Competent  Authorities) try to 
harmonise regulations and practices.
Nuclear safety includes three fields: 
•	 the safety of installations; 
•	  the radioprotection of all groups; and 
•	  the safety of the public in the case of 
accidents ranked between 5 to 7 on 
the International Nuclear Events Scale. 
The basic strategy of nuclear safety is to 
prevent exposure to radiation, to prevent 
uncontrolled dispersion of radioactive sub-
stances and, in the case of an accident, 
to take countermeasures to mitigate the 
effects. This strategy applies to all installa-
tions in the nuclear fuel cycle, from ura-
nium mining to nuclear waste manage-
ment, and takes into account all possible 
natural and anthropogenic events that 
cause fatalities. 
The radioactive matter that presents the 
highest potential hazard is irradiated nu-
Challenges and Opportunities for 
Enhancing the Safety Standards in 
the Nuclear Industry
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clear fuel. As its burn-up increases, so 
the levels of fission product activity, plu-
tonium (Pu), minor actinides increase. Its 
radioactivity increases from kBq/cm³ to 
several tens of Ci/cm³, and its residual 
thermal power output increases from 0 to 
approximately 100 W/cm³. 
Worldwide, there are very high levels of 
movement and storage of radioactive 
matter. About 10 000 tons of spent nuclear 
fuel is discharged from nuclear plants 
each year. Nuclear reactors and repro-
cessing spent fuel facilities are the major 
challenges to nuclear safety. The event 
of greatest concern is the nuclear core 
meltdown.
The NSSs are well established in the nu-
clear industry, based on lessons learnt 
from 14 000 operating reactor-years all 
around the world and from minor inci-
dents and major accidents that have 
taken place at nuclear power plants, no-
tably at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. 
In principle, NSSs represent the state-of-
the-art in terms of nuclear safety. 
The safety of most Generation II reactors 
has been improved in the light of feed-
back received from the Three Mile Island 
accident in 1979, for example in respect 
of the provision of essential power and 
cooling water, but only Generation III 
reactors have additional built-in safety, 
such as the containment of corium and 
the ability to withstand a large plane 
crash. Both are major improvements that 
should reduce the need to evacuate 
people and to control the sale of goods. 
The principal safety features of the Genera-
tion III European Pressurised Reactor are 
shown in Figure 4.1. 
Improvements in nuclear safety are of 
particular interest and concern to: 
•	  operators who are responsible for the 
nuclear safety of their installations;
•	 nuclear safety authorities;
•	  other authorities in charge of public 
safety.
Double confinement
building with ventilation
and filtration
Corium spreading
out emplacement
Cooling system of
confinement building
4 redundant
back-up systems
Passive hydrogen 
recombination 
systems
Indoor water batch
Figure  4.1: Principal safety features of the Generation III European Pressurised Reactor 
(Source: Adapted from Areva and EDF Group) 
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Since the Fukushima accident, many coun-
tries have indicated the need to review 
and upgrade the NSS. 
Challenges
Designs of installations and plans to pre-
vent and/or mitigate accidents stem from 
a deterministic and/or probabilistic Safe-
ty Case Analysis (SCA). This leads to an 
evaluation of the risks and the steps to be 
taken to mitigate the risks. The SCA ad-
dresses the planning and the coordina-
tion of the emergency and post-accident 
periods particularly in respect of radiation 
exposure. With respect to reactors, the 
SCA should take into account the physi-
cal and chemical phenomena that oc-
cur during an accident, the characteris-
tics of the dispersed radioactive matter, 
the characteristics of the contaminated 
areas, and the hazards of radioactivity.
Some of the phenomena to be consi-
dered are illustrated in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
Considerable research has already been 
conducted in relation to nuclear safety, 
both on a national and international level. 
Nuclear safety refers not only to basic 
safety functions, rules and regulations, 
but also to scientific evaluation. Any ad-
vancement of the basic knowledge of 
the behaviour of nuclear fuel, or improve-
ment in the management of nuclear ac-
cidents, will contribute to the improve-
ment of NSS.
Each accident stimulates research in the 
field of nuclear safety because it brings to 
light new scientific and societal phenom-
Figure 4.2: Main processes in the case of a loss of cooling 
(Source: Adapted from different sources)
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ena. The Fukushima accident confirmed 
what was known about the behaviour of 
non-cooled nuclear fuel and revealed 
the kinetics of the irreversible processes 
that can occur. The accident has em-
phasised:
•	  That independent events of a very low 
probability can occur quasi-simulta-
neously, presenting the challenge to 
re-examine the SCA methodology to 
take into account such events as po-
tential initiators of a serious accident.
•	  The difficulties related to cooling the 
nuclear fuel (in the reactor core and 
used fuel pools). The challenges pre-
sented concern assuring additional 
internal and external water reserves, 
limiting the quantities of fuel assem-
blies in reactor pools, and conside-
ring a containment system for poten-
tial radioactive emission from these 
facilities.
•	  Radioactive waste production, inclu-
ding contaminated water, can be 
important and can become a major 
problem to society. The challenges 
are to manage these wastes without 
delay in order to avoid dissemina-
tion of radioactivity and to decon-
taminate water for recycling.
•	  The difficulties of controlling chemical 
hazards, such as the explosion of hy-
drogen.  The challenge is to install large 
capacity plant to manage hydrogen 
(passive recombination) and to con-
trol the cooling of corium.
•	  The emission of radioactive substan-
ces to the local environment can last 
a long time, without the dilution that 
occurs in the case of long-distance 
transportation. The challenge is to 
model the short distance transport 
and the deposition of radionuclides.
•	  The necessity of decontaminating 
large areas in order to allow residents 
to return quickly to the area. The chal-
lenge is to find decontamination 
methods that will not spread the ra-
dioactivity to other areas.
The Fukushima accident has revealed 
new phenomena related to the reaction 
of hot fuel with water, of corium with wa-
ter and concerning the radiolysis of water 
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at a very high temperature. The accident 
has given rise to questions concerning:
•	  The validity of probability estimates of 
a severe nuclear accident. The proba-
bility of core-melt is above 10-4 per 
year.
•	 The safety of nuclear energy.
•	  The transparency and credibility of in-
formation.
•	  Decisions taken by the authorities in 
terms of managing the accident.
Opportunities
The Fukushima accident has not called 
the NSS into question, but does suggest 
that the NSS should be applied with in-
creased rigour and that some aspects of 
the NSS should be improved.
Fukushima presents opportunities to:
•	  increase the pool of national and in-
ternational independent experts;
•	  connect national safety organisa-
tions to enhance and share expertise
•	  increase the credibility of the SCA 
and make it comprehensible and 
known to the public;
•	  check the capacity of reactors to resist 
unanticipated events at design incep-
tion;
•	  prioritise and support basic, applied 
and technological research in nu-
clear safety, merging operators, spe-
cific safety organisations and aca-
demic research organisations.
Research 
Research should be enhanced in the fol-
lowing areas:
•	  The probability of the occurrence of 
natural and anthropogenic events.
•	 Radiology:
o  radiobiological effects of low doses 
(re-examine the linear no-threshold 
theory); 
o effects of chronic low doses; 
o  dose limits for intervention and/or 
evacuation and for iodine distribu-
tion.
•	  Management of accident remedia-
tion:
o  rapid and complete characterisa-
tion of the contamination of soils; 
o  rapid and complete characterisa-
tion of contamination of living ma-
terials, particularly population dose 
evaluation;
o  large reduction of the contamina-
tion of soils; 
o  behaviour of iodine and caesium 
in recycled materials; 
o  establishment of a crisis epidemio-
logy system to identify and follow-
up exposed people. 
•	 Current reactors: 
o  ageing of components (for ex-
ample reactor pressure vessel and 
cables);
o  prevention of chemical hazards 
(hydrogen explosion);
o viability of systems;
o  human and organisational factors. 
•	 Severe accidents: 
o Basic research into: 
	  fuel behaviour at high tempe-
rature and corium formation;
	  physiochemical properties of 
fission products and transura-
nic elements;
	  transport of radionuclides within 
the core, the primary circuit, the 
containment and the environ-
ment; 
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	  modelling the dispersion of ra-
dionuclides in the near and far 
field according to weather 
forecasting.
o Technological research into: 
	  loss of cooling and insertion of 
reactivity; 
	  behaviour of corium in contact 
with steel, water and concrete. 
•	  Innovation in various areas, such as 
new materials, new cladding, new 
fuels, wireless transmission of measure-
ments, remote control of reactor op-
erations and sarcophagus safety.
Conclusion
The international community should prog-
ress into the future by agreeing to:
•	 increase the role of IAEA;
•	  enhance cooperation with regard to 
nuclear safety: peer review can re-
veal incipient failures;
•	  apply and enhance common NSSs 
and basic safety standards;
•	  base the SCA on a scientific approach 
as well as on regulatory requirements;
•	  strongly support research in nuclear 
safety. 
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Challenges for Nuclear Power
Nuclear Fuel Resources
One of the challenges for nuclear power 
is the perception that global uranium re-
sources are only enough to supply fuel 
for the next 100 years. This issue is often 
raised by the environmental movement. 
However, new uranium discoveries are 
being made on a yearly basis and, as 
nuclear energy returns to the agenda, 
exploration by mining companies will 
continue to source more uranium. New 
technologies could enable the extrac-
tion of uranium from sea water. 25 bil-
lion tons of uranium in the Earth’s oceans 
would fuel the world’s current nuclear 
fleet for about 7 million years!
Further, thorium can be used to breed 
233U to double the world’s current nuclear 
fuel material reserves, and would remove 
many safeguard challenges. India, hav-
ing the largest reserves of thorium in the 
world, is making progress in this area: It is 
necessary to link the thorium reactor pro-
gramme to the uranium programme, 
because it would be necessary to build a 
stockpile of 233U. 
Currently only 235U is ‘burnt’ in reactor 
fuel but only 0.7 per cent of natural ura-
nium consists of 235U. The other 99.3 per 
cent is 238U which remains ‘unburnt’ and 
ends up in spent fuel. Spent fuel is not to 
be considered waste since it contains a 
huge resource, namely the unburnt 238U 
and plutonium isotopes. Fast breeder re-
actors convert 238U into 239Pu, thereby po-
tentially increasing the world’s burnable 
uranium stocks by a factor of over 100.
Fusion
There is also increased interest in fusion 
technology. All current nuclear electri-
city generation is fission-based. Nuclear 
fusion, however, offers almost limitless fuel 
reserves in the form of lithium and water. 
The global research collaboration Inter-
national Thermonuclear Experimental Re-
actor is the world’s response to the fusion 
challenge. The challenge in relation to 
fusion is that, in overcoming the electro-
static repulsion between tritium and deu-
terium nuclei, which requires very high 
temperatures, these nuclei generate their 
own magnetic fields, which cause ‘leaks’ 
in the applied field confining them. A so-
lution could be to fuse neutrons from a fis-
sion reactor with helium-3 (3He).
Challenges and Opportunities for 
Enhancing the Development of Safer 
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Unfortunately, naturally occurring 3He is 
extremely rare, but there are millions of 
tons of it on the moon, occluded in ilmen-
ite rock. There is a theoretical possibility 
of fusing 3He nuclei (to give 4He plus two 
protons), albeit at very high temperature. 
3He would constitute an entirely radiation-
free nuclear fuel. This would require Inter-
national Thermonuclear Experimental Re-
actor’s involvement. 
Spent Fuel
Spent fuel represents a further challenge. 
It is necessary to develop a plan for its 
management. Although the amount of 
spent fuel is much less than ash and green-
house gas emissions from coal-fired plants, 
concerns remain that the nuclear industry 
has an incomplete business plan. As yet, 
very few countries internationally license 
long-term spent fuel repositories. It is crucial 
to initiate a realistic, ongoing plan for spent 
fuel for immediate implementation. 
Technologies exist that are in theory ca-
pable of almost closing the fuel cycle by 
burning all radionuclides to non-radio-
active products in fast reactors, thus sig-
nificantly reducing the waste volume to 
a small percentage of shorter-lived non-
fissionable nuclides. Using a particle accel-
erator, the remaining radioactive nuclides 
can be transmuted to non-radioactive 
nuclides. The costs of finding long-term so-
lutions to challenges relating to spent fuel 
waste are considerable. Several current 
research programmes are devoted to 
these long-term projects. 
Public Perception
Some of the issues relating to the public 
perception of the nuclear industry, partic-
ularly following the Fukushima accident, 
are:
•	 The nuclear industry is its own worst 
enemy in that it apologises for every-
thing, thereby appearing to take the 
blame.
•	 The nuclear industry suffers from 
‘over-the-top’ syndrome. When you 
apply for a licence to bury some-
thing 800 m underground, will any-
one believe you when you say it’s 
more or less harmless?
•	 Lessons should be learnt from nu-
clear accidents and from how other 
industries manage their accidents. 
Do not promise the public that there 
will never be another accident. 
Where are we now?
There have been three generations of 
nuclear power reactors, with the fourth 
still in the concept stage (Figure 5.1). The 
rough distinctions between the various 
generations are:
Generation I:  
Prototypes and early power reactors. 
Generation II:
 Commercial designs built on the expe-
rience of Generation 1 up to the end of 
the 1990s.
Generation III:
 Evolutionary safety improvements on Ge-
neration II, with much lower core damage 
frequency achieved largely by multiple 
redundancy of safety systems and passive 
safety features.
Generation IV:
Revolutionary and futuristic designs inclu-
ding full passive safety, closed fuel cycle 
and better economics.
There are currently several different de-
signs of operating power reactors, the 
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most common being pressurised water 
reactors (265) followed by boiling water 
reactors (94), pressurised heavy water re-
actors (44), gas-cooled reactors (18), light 
water graphite reactors (12), fast breeder 
reactors (4), and other types (4). There are 
three main groups of existing reactors cur-
rently in the world: North America, Europe 
and Japan/Korea/Southern China. The 
locus of new build is moving eastwards, 
with limited build in Europe and the United 
States and more in Russia, India, China, 
Korea and Japan. The west is de-industri-
alising and can therefore address its CO2 
emission targets by other means. Power 
reactors currently under construction are 
pressurised water reactors (50), advanced 
boiling water reactors (4), fast breeder re-
actors (2) and other types (1). The greater 
diversity of designs of the past is shrinking.
What is being done?
The Generation IV International Forum 
is developing six nuclear reactor systems 
for deployment between 2020 and 2030. 
Three of these are fast neutron reactors. All 
operate at higher temperatures than to-
day’s reactors. In particular, four are desig-
nated for hydrogen production. All six sys-
tems represent advances in sustainability, 
economics, safety, reliability and prolifera-
tion-resistance. South Africa is one of the 
13 members of the Forum that focuses on 
developing these six designs.
Relative to current nuclear power plant 
technology, the claimed benefits for fourth 
generation reactors include:
•	  nuclear waste that lasts a few centu-
ries instead of millennia; 
•	  one to three hundred times more en-
ergy yield from the same amount of 
nuclear fuel;
•	  the ability to consume existing nuclear 
waste in the production of electricity;
•	 improved operating safety;
•	  economically more competitive than 
the current generation.
Figure 5.1: Generations of nuclear reactors 3
3 http://www.cvrez.cz/web/en/node/121
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Opportunities
The further development of nuclear tech-
nology in South Africa presents several 
opportunities including:
•	  The opportunity to bootstrap South Af-
rican science and technology on the 
back of a several hundred billion rand 
spend on nuclear new build.
•	  The opportunity for South Africa to be 
part of a global effort to reduce the 
carbon footprint of the world.
•	  The uranium value chain could be 
used to attract investors to this country 
given that South Africa has perhaps 
the sixth largest uranium reserves in 
the world.
•	  The opportunity to develop local 
high-spec manufacturing which would 
reduce the foreign exchange imbal-
ance resulting from a massive spend on 
nuclear build.
•	  Numerous opportunities for the social 
sciences to make a practical contri-
bution in the realm of public opinion 
and understanding.
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Background 
The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) has no jurisdiction in any of its mem-
ber states. It provides safety requirements 
and guidelines, and member states are 
left to establish their own legislative system 
to ensure a high level of safety for the pro-
tection of people and the environment. 
IAEA safety requirements and guidelines 
are contained in approximately 125 
documents, ranging from 30 to 300 pag-
es each, and most have in excess of 20 
references. At a reading rate of 10 min-
utes per page, it would take 41 years 
to read through the complete set of 
documents. The word ‘tsunami’ is men-
tioned very few times in the IAEA safety 
requirements and guidelines. 
The report of the Generation IV Interna-
tional Forum meeting in Lucerne in Oc-
tober 2011, by Dr Van Zyl de Villiers of the 
South African Nuclear Energy Corpora-
tion of (Necsa), indicates that mention 
was made at the meeting that the Inte-
grated Safety Assessment Methodology 
would not necessarily have identified the 
unique combination of natural events 
that led to the Fukushima accident, and 
that “the challenge remained with the 
proper application of methodologies of 
this nature and not necessarily the meth-
odologies themselves”. It was suggested 
that systems engineering (SE) offered a 
part solution towards better application 
of methodologies. 
A processes view of SE in Handbook 3 
of the International Council of Systems 
Engineering (INCOSE), portraying the 
modern approach to SE, indicates that 
industry should follow a process-orientated 
approach to design. It distinguishes be-
tween processes that must be detailed in 
the enterprise that is conducting SE sup-
ported by agreement processes. The sys-
tem lifecycle management process calls 
for process guidelines to be established 
by the enterprise in support of project 
processes and technical processes. It is 
important to note that the stakeholder 
requirement definition process, the initial 
stage in technical processes, is followed 
by requirement analysis, and later by sys-
tem design or architectural design.
The concept of baseline management in 
a systems approach is referred to as the 
‘V’ model (Figure 6.1). The model depicts 
increases in time and maturity of baselines 
as specified in plans, specifications and 
Nuclear Energy Safety: 
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products that are under progressive con-
figuration management. The first base-
line, according to a systems approach, 
is a stakeholder requirement specifica-
tion (SRS). The last baseline to be verified 
enables validation of the viability of the 
SRS. This presents a dilemma in that only 
after the system has been developed, 
constructed and commissioned, and pro-
duction has started is it possible to validate 
whether the initial specifications are vi-
able. 
In applying the ‘V’ model to the new 
build programme, it is necessary to:
•	  Define the ‘industrial system’ 
  The industrial system in this instance is 
the system of interest for nuclear en-
ergy safety (NES), comprising the licen-
see, the system integrator, the nuclear 
vendor, other vendors, sub-vendors, 
the nuclear site, plant and equipment, 
all documentation, all personnel and 
all logistics throughout the lifecycle. 
There are also related systems, such 
as government departments, legisla-
tive systems including the National Nu-
clear Regulator (NNR), the commu-
nity, environment and other systems. 
The system of interest for the system 
integrator is called the ‘plant system’, 
comprising various sub-elements.
•	  Distinguish safety from safety assu-
rance
  In the systems approach to NES it is 
necessary to be sure that:
o  The industrial system produces 
a safe nuclear plant system.
o  The nuclear plant system will ope-
rate safely throughout its life.
o  The industrial system is capable 
of supporting the nuclear plant 
system over its full life.
o  The nuclear plant system can 
be de-commissioned safely. 
Figure 6.1: Nuclear energy safety – a systems approach
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It should be noted that safety is one of 
the characteristics of the system, whereas 
safety assurance is the process whereby 
safety of a system is systematically moni-
tored, evaluated and improved. 
•	  Achieve safety assurance in the new 
build
  There is only one way in which safety 
assurance can be achieved for the 
new build programme, and that is 
by baselining and formally contrac-
ting safety assurance throughout the 
contracting chain. It follows that the 
process for monitoring and evaluating 
safety must be baselined and con-
tracted top down to the lowest con-
tract level. Baselining is a process in 
its own right, involving many steps, one 
of which is the identification of the sys-
tem’s stakeholders. 
•	  Identify the new build programme 
stakeholders
  INCOSE Handbook 3 defines a stake-
holder as a party having a right, share 
or claim in a system or in the charac-
teristics of a system that meets that 
party’s needs and expectations. Ex-
amples of new build stakeholders are:
o  The NNR, as its mandate is assu-
rance of public safety, although it 
is not part of the industrial system.
o  The local community, as locals ex-
pect job opportunities and should 
share in the job-creation charac-
teristic of the system.
  The media does not fit the defini-
tion of a stakeholder from the SE 
perspective, but from a project 
governance perspective, the me-
dia is a stakeholder, in the interest 
of transparency and openness. 
The IAEA document NG-T-14 with 
the title, “Stakeholder involvement 
throughout the lifecycle of nu-
clear facilities”, makes interesting 
reading in this regard. 
•	  Apply the baseline management for 
the new build 
  The baseline management has its 
own ‘V’, and the user requirement 
specification (URS) is currently being 
written by Eskom. If the SE approach is 
followed, a SRS including needs and 
expectations of all stakeholders is re-
quired instead of a URS. 
•	  Share a universal truth that problems 
downstream are symptoms of neglect 
upstream. A systems approach should:
o  identify all Nuclear-1 stakehol-
ders;
o  involve the compilation of a SRS 
rather than a URS; 
o  address requirements relating 
to system safety and safety 
assurance separately and ex-
plicitly. 
The lack of visibility and transparency pres-
ents a problem that can be overcome 
by implementing the Inter-Organisational 
Nuclear Knowledge Management Sys-
tem that is being developed at the North-
West University by PhD student, Ms Lüka 
Potgieter.
Overview of the Inter-Organisational Nu-
clear Knowledge Management System
SE provides a complete overview of the 
nuclear industry, its stakeholders, the in-
teraction between stakeholders and 
the activities. The Inter-Organisational 
Nuclear Knowledge Management Sys-
tem can be implemented and utilised 
as a tool to facilitate and observe com-
pliance in the system. 
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The aim of the project is to create, main-
tain and operate a web-based know-
ledge management system for the South 
African nuclear industry. The objective of 
the system is to communicate, integrate 
and facilitate the role and function of all 
stakeholders in the South African nuclear 
industry towards successful and cost-effec-
tive execution of nuclear projects and ope-
rations. The concept for the operation of 
the system was presented.
In South Africa, the NNR can be viewed 
as a stakeholder to the nuclear industry 
system and its operations. The nuclear in-
dustrial system consists of Eskom, Necsa, 
the vendor and sub-contractors. Further-
more, the public, government and other 
organisations are also external stake-
holders involved in the nuclear system. 
All these organisations formally interact 
not only with the NNR, but also with one 
another. 
The Inter-Organisational Nuclear Know-
ledge Management System captures all 
formal information flow in particular docu-
mentation that serves to verify quality and 
relates to education in nuclear safety be-
tween the stakeholders and the nuclear 
industry by providing: 
•	  Best-practice guidelines on how nu-
clear energy safety management 
should take place.
•	  Real-time facilitation and compliance 
monitoring of the safety assurance 
process.
•	  Auto-verification on the quality of the 
information flow. 
The features of the Inter-Organisational 
Nuclear Knowledge Management Sys-
tem are:
•	  It captures business processes of the 
South African industry at large.
•	  The system does not interfere with the 
internal processes of any stakeholder.
•	  It facilitates formal interaction between 
industry stakeholders and defines these 
interfaces in terms of processes be-
tween stakeholders, knowledge ex-
changed within the processes, and de-
liverables as delivered at the end of 
processes. 
•	  It organises these processes, knowledge 
and deliverables in project lifecycle con-
texts. 
•	  It only captures and integrates those 
processes, knowledge and deliverables 
that are designed to defuse across an 
organisation’s boundary.
•	  When implemented, the system will 
contribute to confidence building in 
the nuclear industry. 
The value proposition is:
•	  The system will guide information flow 
between the stakeholders without dis-
turbing internal workflows of the organi-
sation. 
•	  The system will offer best practice 
guidelines as baseline for formal infor-
mation flow.
•	  The system will ensure that all inter-
organisation information flow is visible 
and transparent to the various parties, 
aiding informed decision-making. 
•	  The system will continuously keep re-
cord of all inter-organisation informa-
tion flow in order to ensure traceability 
in the nuclear environment, and could 
also provide a backup of all inter-or-
ganisation information flow.
•	  The system will therefore provide a 
communication interface between nu-
clear stakeholders, ensuring efficient 
and secure information sharing, even 
to the public. 
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Based on the advantages mentioned 
above, the system and its attributes will 
build confidence and contribute towards 
a sustainable nuclear industry. 
The question may arise as to how the sys-
tem could be implemented to not only 
provide a baseline on what information 
should flow between whom and when, 
but also, how it can be monitored and 
facilitated in real time. The NNR has a re-
sponsibility and mandate to ensure safety 
of the public and the environment. It in-
teracts with the nuclear industrial system 
through its regulatory framework. The In-
ter-Organisational Nuclear Knowledge 
Management System will capture all 
formal information between the stake-
holders, including with the NNR, by gui-
ding the system through its lifecycles. The 
system will be implemented on a web-
based platform linking the stakeholders 
by providing secure access to the system 
without compromising their internal busi-
ness processes. 
A helpful metaphor for the system is a spi-
der camera at a football match. It does 
not participate in the game but contin-
uously hovers above the players, monito-
ring the game with the rulebook in hand 
so that it can draw attention to anything 
that is not according to best practice. 
The baseline provided by the system will 
include:
•	  Best practice on the processes that 
should be followed where the stake-
holders interact. 
•	  A reference to the quality of informa-
tion that diffuses across company bor-
ders. 
The system will make use of artificial in-
telligence technology to compare real-
time information to a database of know-
ledge, which will be created with input 
from the NNR. This system will be able to 
recognise if information in a document 
lacks valuable information and be able 
to notify the correct party, improving ef-
ficiency of interactions. From a localisa-
tion perspective, the system will provide 
the regulations, standards and specifi-
cations that manufacturers, construction 
companies and maintenance industries 
will have to comply with.
The following matters required further con-
sideration in the development of the sys-
tem:
•	  information overload on the extra-net;
•	 security of the knowledge;
•	 maintenance of the system;
•	 best-practice guidelines;
•	 governance of the system;
•	 independence of the Regulator.
Conclusion
The Inter-Organisational Nuclear Know-
ledge Management System is actively 
being researched and developed. The 
proof of concept software solution is be-
ing finalised. The ultimate aim is to vali-
date whether the system, as built and as 
operated, will comply with its SRS. It follows 
that, according to the systems approach 
to nuclear energy safety, the ultimate 
safety and safety assurance of nuclear 
energy is determined by the first baseline, 
which is its SRS. It is therefore necessary to:
•	  specify that ultimate safety and safety 
assurance of nuclear energy are de-
termined by the first baseline, which is 
its SRS;
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•	  ensure that it is properly promulgated 
throughout all baselines;
•	  ensure that it is properly contracted 
at all levels;
•	  ensure that compliance is monitored 
throughout the project (and system) 
lifecycles;
•	  ensure that non-compliance is rectified. 
In order for SE to accomplish nuclear 
energy safety, it is essential that each of 
these aspects is transparent and visible to 
all and that there is buy-in from the NNR, 
Eskom and government. 
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Introduction 
This symposium provides a platform for a 
free exchange of views concerning issues 
of nuclear safety as South Africa prepares 
for the nuclear expansion programme 
and considers consolidating and impro-
ving the existing nuclear capacity in the 
country in the light of many developments 
in the nuclear industry both regionally and 
internationally. 
Context for Nuclear Energy Safety 
The word ‘nuclear’ evokes certain memo-
ries, more specifically:
•	  Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station 
accident in 1979, as a result of funda-
mental problems involving hardware, 
procedures, training and attitudes to-
wards safety complicated by regula-
tory concerns.
•	  Chernobyl accident in 1986, which 
presents a stark reminder of hazards 
associated with nuclear technology, 
particularly in terms of the lack of deli-
berate strategies and systems to pro-
actively and rigorously address the is-
sues of nuclear safety. 
•	  Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station re-
actor vessel head degradation in 2002. 
•	  Fukushima Daiichi accident in March 
2011.
These accidents create understandable 
anxiety about nuclear technology. The 
area of commonality in all the accidents 
relates to the role (or lack thereof) per-
taining to the regulatory authorities. It is 
therefore appropriate to question the role 
of regulatory authorities in nuclear energy 
safety development, as well as take cog-
nisance of the substantial achievements 
and advancements of nuclear energy 
and technology. It is interesting that, as in 
other facets of life, the nuclear industry’s 
clean record and high standing in society 
can be destroyed by a single lapse. Extra 
vigilance is necessary, and a deliberate 
effort must be made concerning mat-
ters of nuclear energy safety in order to 
engender confidence among the public 
and the authorities.
Role of the Regulatory Authorities 
The role of the regulatory authorities is to 
promote and enforce a safety culture. 
There is a safety dichotomy in relation to 
the role of operators as opposed to the 
role of the regulator. The approach to 
regulation adopted by the NNR is that 
The Role of Regulatory Authorities 
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the responsibility for safety lies with the 
operator. The NNR ensures that the sys-
tem of safety and operation is adequate 
and that it meets the demands of safety 
in line with international best practice. The 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations sug-
gests the following definition of a safety 
culture: “An organisation’s values and 
behaviours – modelled by its leaders and 
internalised by its members – that serve to 
make nuclear safety an overriding priority”.
Although safety parameters may be de-
termined and rigorous controls may be in 
place, safety systems are not foolproof, 
and complete safety of a nuclear installa-
tion cannot be guaranteed, particularly in 
relation to imposing elements. It is essential 
to ensure that mechanisms are in place to 
prepare for such eventualities, nonethe-
less the extent of the preparation might still 
not have taken into account the severity 
of the impact of unanticipated eventu-
alities. The safety culture should be the un-
derlying premise of the operator.
The role of regulatory authorities covers 
three major areas:
•	  Promotional: Encouraging and promo-
ting safety principles and practice, as 
a voice of conscience.
•	  Corrective: Providing guidance and 
support.
•	  Adjudicative: Intervening decisively in 
the interest of safety.
A strong safety culture is underpinned by 
the following principles:
•	  Everyone is personally responsible for 
nuclear safety.
•	  Leaders demonstrate commitment to 
safety.
•	 Trust permeates the organisation.
•	 Decision-making reflects safety first.
•	  Nuclear technology is recognised as 
special and unique.
•	 A questioning attitude is cultivated.
•	  Organisational learning is embraced.
•	  Nuclear safety undergoes constant 
examination, noting that many safe-
ty concerns and incidents arise out of 
complacency.
Global Safety Regime 
The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) provides the framework within 
which the Global Safety Regime operates, 
seeking to achieve worldwide implemen-
tation of a high level of safety at nuclear 
installations. The framework essentially 
comprises the activities undertaken by 
each country to ensure the safety and 
security of the nuclear installations within 
various jurisdictions, augmented by the 
activities of a variety of international enter-
prises that facilitate nuclear safety.
Several elements cited in the Global Safe-
ty Regime framework relate to:
•	 intergovernmental organisations;
•	  multinational networks among opera-
tors;
•	  multinational networks among regula-
tors;
•	 the international nuclear industry;
•	  multinational networks among scien-
tists;
•	  international standards setting organi-
sations;
•	  other stakeholders such as the public, 
news media and non-government 
organisations that are engaged in nu-
clear safety.
The Global Safety Regime is entrenched 
in several international conventions that 
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are legally binding on the participating 
states. South Africa has ratified or acce-
ded to all the conventions, and is there-
fore obliged to adhere to the highest stan-
dards of nuclear energy safety. Central 
and most important to the Global Safety 
Regime is a strong national nuclear in-
frastructure, including an independent 
Nuclear Regulator. It is recognised that 
some elements of the Global Safety Re-
gime, although functional today, should 
be strengthened, especially after the Fu-
kushima accident. These elements are, 
for example:
•	  The use of the review meetings of the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety as a ve-
hicle for open and critical peer review 
and a source for learning from the best 
practices of others.
•	  The enhanced utilisation of the IAEA 
Safety Standards for the harmonisation 
of national safety regulations to the 
greatest degree possible.
•	  The enhanced exchange of operating 
experience and the use of this expe-
rience for lifecycle management and 
back-fitting of nuclear facilities, as well 
as for improving operating and regula-
tory practices.
•	  The multinational cooperation for the 
safety review of new nuclear power 
plant designs.
The IAEA convened the Ministerial Confer-
ence on Nuclear Safety in response to the 
Fukushima event, which concluded that:
•	  The IAEA should review and strength-
en as appropriate its safety standards 
related to design requirements with 
particular emphasis on defence in 
depth, low probability beyond design 
basis events, single or in combina-
tion, severe accident management, 
and measures for single-unit sites and, 
more especially, for multi-unit sites.
•	  In response, the NNR requested the 
operators in South Africa to conduct 
safety reassessments. The NNR will as-
certain the extent to which measures 
have been put in place to ensure that 
the facilities are able to withstand ex-
treme external events, a combination 
of external events, as well as prolonged 
catastrophes, and provide feedback 
in this regard. The NNR will ensure that 
these issues are factored into the de-
sign of the new build programme.
•	  Conventions such as the Convention 
on Nuclear Safety need to be reviewed 
taking into account the lessons learnt 
from Fukushima, particularly in relation 
to transparency, the independence of 
regulators, emergency preparedness 
and peer reviews.
•	  The international, regional and natio-
nal emergency and response frame-
works should be strengthened. 
Role of the Regulator 
Section 5 of the National Nuclear Regula-
tor Act (Act 47 of 1999) provides that the 
objectives of the Regulator are, among 
others, to:
•	  Provide for the protection of persons, 
property and the environment against 
nuclear damage through the establish-
ment of safety standards and regula-
tory practices.
•	  Exercise regulatory control related to 
safety over the siting, design, construc-
tion, operation, manufacture of com-
ponent parts, and decontamination, 
decommissioning and closure of nu-
clear installations through the issuance 
of nuclear authorisations.
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•	  Provide assurance of compliance with 
the conditions of nuclear authorisations 
through the implementation of a sys-
tem of compliance inspections.
•	  Fulfil national obligations in respect of 
international legal instruments concer-
ning nuclear safety.
•	  Ensure that provisions for nuclear emer-
gency planning are in place.
The NNR is prepared for the new nuclear 
build programme and acknowledges the 
importance of early engagement with 
stakeholders, particularly concerning the 
above provisions in the National Nuclear 
Regulator Act. 
Future Nuclear Safety Development 
The NNR safety standards require that the 
safety demonstration should include both 
deterministic and probabilistic safety as-
sessments, which have been applied with 
the licensing of the Koeberg units. The 
standardisation of designs and harmoni-
sation of standards will significantly contri-
bute to increased safety globally. 
The NNR participates in international fo-
rums such as the Multinational Design Eva-
luation Programme and IAEA safety com-
mittees, and will be reviewing its standards 
and factoring in the lessons from Fukushi-
ma. The principles of continuous feedback 
relating to improvement and operating 
experience as part of nuclear safety will 
be the underlying basis of the NNR ope-
rations to ensure a process of continuous 
improvement. The NNR will also focus on 
strengthening the regulatory framework, 
from siting to decommissioning. 
Conclusion
It is crucial to make sure that nuclear safe-
ty principles are embraced and a con-
tinuous learning environment is cultivated 
by all the players in the nuclear industry. 
Nuclear energy safety should be placed 
as an overriding priority in order to engen-
der the level of confidence that the pub-
lic requires of the industry, and to show-
case nuclear technology as a means of 
enhancing the development agenda 
and contributing to a sustainable environ-
ment. The NNR will endeavour to play this 
role, rejecting complacency, and confi-
dently face the challenge of ensuring the 
safety of nuclear energy. 
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Introduction
The conceptual approach to the debate 
concerning public perceptions on any 
subject or technology including nuclear 
energy is that whatever the public percep-
tion is, it is based on an idea. If the public 
perception is therefore to be changed, it is 
necessary to understand that it is an idea 
that is being changed, consequently the 
approach should entail finding another 
idea that will be perceived to be more 
beneficial or superior to the one already 
held. 
Another important aspect concerning 
public perception, in particular with re-
gards to nuclear technology, is the shifts in 
paradigm and decision-making factors in 
the public, as stated by the premises be-
low:
Premise 1:  
There has been a paradigm shift in the 
structure of power in many countries. This 
implies that there will be a shift in the think-
ing and decision process regarding nu-
clear technology and energy. In the past, 
decisions relating to new technologies 
were made either by the private sector or 
politicians with a small group of elite 
scientists. Today, there is increased acti-
vism by public interest groups and the me-
dia, as well as broader legislative involve-
ment and significant judicial intervention. 
The implication of this shift is that the public 
can no longer be ignored in decisions pro-
cesses for a nuclear programme.
Premise 2:  
The factors that impact on the future of a 
nuclear programme are very dynamic. In 
the past, decisions about a nuclear future 
were based on standards and techni-
cal factors, like economics, technology, 
etc. This is no longer the case because of 
increased public interest and activism. Be-
havioural factors have now to be taken 
into consideration in making decisions con-
cerning nuclear energy. This implies that the 
status of public relations divisions should be 
elevated to a higher level of strategic im-
portance in organisations.
Public Perception of Nuclear Energy 
To achieve meaningful public engage-
ment the level of public acceptance 
should be known or at least inferred. Some 
notion of the level of public acceptance 
can be gleaned from surveys conducted 
in the United States over the last 10 years 
Public Engagement and 
Perceptions of Nuclear Energy 
and Associated Risks
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by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and 
others. The surveys by NEI reveal improved 
public acceptance of nuclear generation 
between 1998 and 2010. Approximately 
70 per cent of members of the public 
surveyed in 2010 accepted nuclear as a 
source of energy generation (Figure. 8.1). 
Surveys by Gallup Poll show a similar up-
ward trend, at least from 2001, although 
there has been a slight decline in public 
acceptance of nuclear technology since 
March 2011 (Figure 8.2).
These surveys as depicted by the figures 
below suggest that the public accep-
tance was highest around 2010, with some 
declines after the accident in Fukushima. 
For countries requiring to engage the pub-
lic regarding a nuclear programme, these 
figures raise the following important ques-
tions:
•	  What should be the level of public ac-
ceptance of nuclear power required 
for decision-makers to proceed with 
or halt a nuclear programme? 
•	  Is it foreseeable that any technology 
would achieve 100 per cent accep-
tance from the public in any country?
One hundred per cent acceptance is not 
even achieved when voting into power 
a political party, yet political parties take 
power daily all over the world based on 
some meaningful public mandate. Simi-
larly, for a country to pursue a nuclear pro-
gramme, some meaningful level of public 
acceptance is required.
Managing Public Engagement 
It appears that the decision about whether 
or not a country should proceed with a 
nuclear programme is a matter of politi-
cal will based on political interpretation 
of public perception and acceptance, 
and on the successful management of 
activism through, inter alia, legislative pro-
cesses, openness, empowerment and 
education. This begs the question about 
who manages activism, and this leads to 
the concept of public engagement.
Figure  8.1: Public acceptance survey in the United States, 1998-2010 
(Source: Nuclear Energy Institute4)
4 http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/publications/perspectiveonpublicopinion/perspective-on-
public-opinion-june-2010/
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Managing activism implies engaging 
people in this process through diverse 
ways for several reasons. Rationales for 
public engagement include:
•	  Normative rationale: Ensuring demo-
cratic legitimacy of decisions. Policies 
must be acceptable to the public. 
They must be seen as ‘the right thing 
to do’ in a democratic society.
•	  Instrumental rationale: Facilitating 
ease of decisions and implementation. 
When a decision has public accep-
tance, its implementation also enjoys 
public support.
•	  Substantive rationale: Ensuring the right 
choices are made. The public may 
raise issues that will cause technical 
people to consider aspects which they 
might otherwise have ignored, and in 
so doing may have a better choice of 
technology.
•	  Educational rationale: Demystifying nu-
clear energy and technology. An ap-
propriate public engagement should 
have as its major aspect, an educa-
tional drive so that the public may be 
educated about nuclear energy.
Although there are compelling reasons for 
public engagement, the challenge lies in 
the process of engaging the public. Key 
engagement process decisions include:
•	  What to engage on?
  This should be based on a balance 
between the respect of individual 
rights and collective interest, which 
stems from a moral philosophy and 
from the awareness that public opi-
nion, is dynamic. Most of the engage-
ment should focus on the collective 
benefit. 
•	  Who must engage and who must be 
engaged?
  There should be different levels of en-
gagement, where each level is en-
gaged on the relevant aspect of the 
nuclear energy debate. The Interna-
tional Commission on Radiological 
Protection (ICRP) principles for radia-
tion protection provide a framework 
that can be adapted for guidance 
in determining how and when to en-
gage with the public. The first pillar of 
the ICRP philosophy is justification, 
Figure  8.2: Public acceptance survey, 1995-2011 
(Source: Gallup Poll results on nuclear energy support published in March 20105, and April 2011)6
5http://www.gallup.com/poll/126827/support-nuclear-power-climbs-new-high.aspx     
6http://www.gallup.com/poll/146939/majority-americans-say-nuclear-power-plants-safe.aspx   
NUCLEAR NUCLEAR
 47
public has been sufficiently engaged 
to the point of public acceptance of 
the benefit of airline transport in spite of 
the known risks. One aspect of public 
engagement that the airline industry 
has used, entails first leaving public en-
gagement to be led by public experts 
not technocrats, and thus creating 
messages that will clarify the benefit 
in a language that the public will un-
derstand without unduly complicating 
the message with technical jargon. 
Recent communication about the in-
troduction of the new A380 fleet of air-
lines is an example. One of the airlines, 
Emirates, packaged the message for 
flights on board the Emirates A380 air-
craft that focus on the benefits of fly-
ing in the state-of-the-art aircraft. The 
technological aspects of the aircraft 
are not overly mentioned to the pub-
lic. This affirms the importance of using 
concepts that are in the consumer 
space when engaging the public.
Conclusion
Some conclusions concerning public en-
gagement and perceptions of nuclear 
energy and associated risks include:
•	  The public is rational; it has an opinion 
and hence has a perception. Opinions 
and perceptions are dynamic and not 
conclusive, and public interest is mostly 
focused on collective benefit.
•	  Public acceptance of nuclear energy 
was highest in 2010. It decreased 
somewhat in 2011 as a result of the Fu-
kushima accident but is recovering. 
There is no definite measure, apart 
from political elections, of how much 
public opinion is sufficient for a deci-
sion.
where in the introduction of a nuclear 
activity is justified in terms of benefit 
above acceptable risk. In terms of pub-
lic engagement the level of justification, 
which concerns the benefits of nuclear 
energy would entail the policy-maker 
or relevant wing of government en-
gaging the public to justify the benefit 
of nuclear within the energy mix. Once 
justification is established, there is en-
gagement in relation to an optimisa-
tion dialogue, which is the second 
pillar of the ICRP philosophy. The en-
gagement at the level of optimisation, 
assumes the introduction of nuclear 
energy has been accepted by the 
public, and thus the next issue con-
cerns the performance of a particular 
nuclear energy technology or system 
with regard to factors such as the pa-
rameters of safety, security, etc. At this 
level of engagement, the public is no 
longer engaged for acceptance, but 
rather the technology choice based 
on parameters. The engaging party at 
this level would often be the nuclear 
safety watch-dog (the national nuclear 
regulator and other state agencies). 
Innovative ways to demystify nuclear 
energy and nuclear technology in 
general need to be developed at the 
educational level. 
•	  Mechanisms for meaningful and fair 
engagement.
  Practice in the other industries can be 
instructive to the nuclear and scientific 
world. One such industry is the trans-
port industry, in particular aviation. It is a 
known factor that airplane accidents 
do happen and when they do, many 
lives are lost, yet the public continues 
to use airplanes on daily basis. The rea-
son for the continued use is that the 
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•	  Public engagement must be based 
on a framework, which addresses as 
a minimum, what to engage on, with 
whom to engage and on what, who 
must engage, and the mechanisms 
of engagement.
•	  Nuclear scientists and industry should 
carry most of the blame for not de-
veloping innovative public engage-
ment techniques. Consumer concepts 
rather than technical jargon should be 
used to demystify nuclear energy. We 
have fuelled a suspicious and possible 
negative perception of nuclear ener-
gy by presenting nuclear as the most 
dangerous thing there ever was on 
earth. Perhaps we may wish to blame 
the way the atomic energy was intro-
duced to most members of the public 
through the A-bomb, yet we have de-
cades of public benefit use of the same 
atomic energy which when properly 
packaged could yield a positive pub-
lic perception of nuclear power.
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Background 
The Royal Society’s extensive in-depth re-
view of the nuclear fuel cycle came into 
being because it was recognised that an 
expansion of civilian nuclear power pro-
grammes would occur in the world, with 
some countries embarking on new civil 
programmes for the first time to help meet 
their climate change and energy secu-
rity needs. The so-called ‘nuclear renais-
sance’ has renewed debate about the 
relationship between civil nuclear power 
and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
as well as other security risks. This project 
explored the potential of new technolo-
gies and new governance practices to 
make the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly 
the back end, more proliferation resistant 
and secure. The Royal Society (2011) re-
port entitled Fuel cycle stewardship in a 
nuclear renaissance made recommen-
dations in this regard.
Best Practice for Non-proliferation 
Some comments with regard to best 
practice for non-proliferation are:
•	  Civil nuclear power has its history in 
nuclear weapons programmes in a 
number of countries, whereas reactors 
today are built for civil purposes. The re-
port recommends that all the nuclear 
weapon states should separate their 
nuclear weapon programmes from 
their civil nuclear power programmes, 
placing the latter under international 
safeguards to verify this separation. 
•	  There is no proliferation-proof fuel cy-
cle, and there are problems with all 
the fuel cycles. Hard work is required to 
ensure that the proliferation risks are re-
duced. The International Atomic Ener-
gy Agency (IAEA) is central to mana-
ging dual-use risks. It is important that 
the additional protocol introduced 
by the IAEA, giving the IAEA broader 
inspection capabilities, should detect 
undeclared facilities. The report recom-
mends that all non-nuclear weapon 
states with nuclear power should imple-
ment IAEA comprehensive safeguards 
and the additional protocol.
•	  Proliferation can also occur via per-
sonnel and knowledge. The extent 
to which personnel and knowledge 
from civil nuclear power programmes 
assisted nuclear weapon programmes 
is not clear. Nonetheless, all universi-
ties and industries that are involved in 
the civil nuclear power programmes 
Responsible Stewardship of the 
Nuclear Renaissance: Best Practice 
for Non-proliferation
Prof Roger Cashmore,         
United Kingdom Royal Society, (Presentation via video conference) 
9
NUCLEAR NUCLEAR
50 
should make an effort to develop edu-
cation and awareness-raising courses 
for all their personnel.
•	  The plutonium in the spent fuel should 
be made as unattractive for nuclear 
weapon use as possible. This means 
that the barriers for its use (such as the 
isotopic and radiation barriers) should 
be increased. The report recommends 
that nuclear fuel should be developed 
and nuclear reactors should be con-
figured to enable the maximum burn 
up, consistent with efficient and eco-
nomic operation of the reactor. 
A Nuclear ‘Davos’
An international nuclear power market, 
supply chain and services currently exist. 
Uranium is mined, enriched and fabrica-
ted in different countries, and reactors are 
fabricated in one country and installed 
and operated in another country. There 
is also an international market for re-using 
the spent fuel. Over the last three or four 
decades, national facilities have moved 
and are moving from purely state-run to 
multinational companies, bringing major 
benefits through:
•	  increasing transparency and sprea-
ding best practice;
•	  industry’s overarching interest in non-
proliferation and nuclear security be-
cause a single incident from a civil 
facility will affect the credibility of the 
industry worldwide. 
Global governance does not yet reflect 
the reality of a fully internationalised fuel 
cycle. This multinational industry must be 
part of the solution and not the prob-
lem. The report suggests that the United 
Kingdom government should help to 
establish an industry-led activity world-
wide, a World Nuclear Forum, in order to 
interface with political leaders to explore 
the development of, or responsibilities for, 
nuclear power. 
Integrated Risk Management 
In the aftermath of the Fukushima acci-
dent, it is important to avoid complacen-
cy in all nuclear activities, not only in terms 
of safety, but also with regard to issues of 
security and non-proliferation. Moreover, 
safety, security and proliferation risks 
should no longer be considered in isola-
tion. The integrated approach reflects an 
‘all hazards approach’ to national secu-
rity, covering a range of threats from natu-
ral disasters to man-made accidents or 
malicious attacks by states and non-state 
groups. This integrated approach should 
be taken into account from the outset, 
and in the design of the nuclear facilities. 
Security by design must be introduced 
and become best practice. The World 
Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) brings 
this aspect to the attention of the indus-
try. Safeguards by design should also be 
involved from the beginning of any new 
nuclear installation and should become 
best practice. 
Integration by design allows for syner-
gies to be identified and conflicts to be 
resolved in advance, to develop the best 
safeguard system possible.
National Regulation 
Safety and security are regulated at na-
tional level. The report recommends that 
safety and security be integrated into a 
single national regulatory body (NRB). 
Currently, non-proliferation is regulated 
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at international level. It is in the interests 
of national governments to ensure that 
legislation is in place so that industry sup-
ports safeguards in order to avoid false 
accusations of proliferation. The NRB 
should serve as the focal point for both 
industry and the IAEA.
The NRB should act on the IAEA’s behalf 
during a licensing process, and conform 
to the IAEA activities, which would mean 
that: 
•	  the licensee understands, and the fa-
cility design meets, safeguards both 
safety and security requirements;
•	  delays and conflicts with other regula-
tory requirements would be avoided;
•	  more efficient fuel cycle designs would 
be supported.
International Regulation 
There is no intergovernmental regulator for 
safety and security. The IAEA is a source of 
best practice and advice in these areas. 
As there is no overarching international 
regulator, peer review between countries 
is important to ensure that safety and se-
curity become well developed. 
An integrated governmental peer-review 
system is of vital importance. It should in-
clude appropriate security information, 
on a voluntary basis, in national reports 
submitted as part of the peer-review pro-
cess for safety, and integrate safety and 
security into IAEA advisory services for 
member states.
In terms of integrated industry peer review, 
the World Association of Nuclear Operators 
(WANO) runs peer reviews from country 
to country, and it would be ideal for the 
World Association of National Opera-
tors (WANO) and the World Institute of 
Nuclear Security (WINS) to collaborate 
on joint safety and security reviews. Post-
Fukushima, the nuclear industry has been 
alerted both to problems with the reactor 
operation and potential problems rela-
ting to spent fuel storage.
It is necessary to ensure that everyone 
becomes as concerned and familiar with 
non-proliferation and nuclear security is-
sues as with nuclear safety. Security should 
be introduced as a site licence condition, 
and operators should become liable for 
security just as they are for safety. Integra-
ted corporate governance would ensure 
that the boards of companies operating 
nuclear facilities have a responsibility for 
addressing these issues and reporting on 
them.
Cradle-to-Grave Planning in the Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle 
The management of spent fuel should 
no longer be an afterthought. The entire 
fuel cycle needs to be considered from 
cradle-to-grave at the outset. The multi-
decade to century timescales of new nu-
clear programmes require long-term stra-
tegic planning. In order to deal with the 
extended timescales, countries should:
•	  Develop a national policy that con-
tains a clear indication of the long-
term role for nuclear power in the 
country’s energy strategy, including 
requirements for sufficient interim sto-
rage of spent fuel and the creation of 
a waste management organisation 
to deliver disposal of the final high-
level waste in a timely way.
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•	  Set up a long-term research and de-
velopment (R&D) roadmap to sup-
port spent fuel management strate-
gies. R&D provides the contingency 
for addressing unforeseen changes 
in policy by keeping future manage-
ment options open.
•	  Seek international fuel cycle arrange-
ments, especially when a small nuclear 
programme is being established and 
there is a lack of national capacity. 
It is in the interests of all countries with 
nuclear power to have access to the 
capacity to manage nuclear mate-
rial safely and securely for the benefit 
of all. 
International Spent Fuel Management 
There is renewed interest in non-prolife-
ration and security benefits of cradle-to-
grave fuel cycle services. This notion is 
not new and relates not only to thermal 
reactors but also to research reactors. It 
will become increasingly important when 
considering small and medium-sized re-
actors. 
International services for re-use have 
been available for decades. However, 
large volumes of spent fuel may arise 
from a nuclear renaissance and may 
create a commercial market for disposal 
services. It should be recognised that dis-
posal services will be important particu-
larly for countries that do not have sui-
table geology and resources to dispose 
of nuclear materials safely and securely.
International Disposal
This is a longer term prospect given the 
political sensitivities involved. It is recom-
mended that international disposal may 
be attractive for many countries, and the 
way to begin to develop confidence is 
through partnerships. A group of countries 
could collaborate on a joint waste dispos-
al programme. Governments should be 
encouraged to accept the joint waste 
disposal programmes. One way of deve-
loping partnerships is through collaborative 
R&D, which builds confidence between 
countries and keeps international options 
open. In the longer term, R&D partnerships 
could build trust to foster more integrated 
policies and collaborative infrastructure.
European Approach
The European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity (EURATOM) is the best exemplar of 
a regional approach to fuel cycle man-
agement. There was a lack of cradle-to-
grave thinking 50 years ago. A regional 
approach is gradually being developed 
for the front end, but does not yet exist for 
the back end, except for the business of 
reprocessing. A European Community Di-
rective in 2011 requires that all members 
of the European Union with nuclear power 
programmes should have a plan for dea-
ling with their spent fuel and radioactive 
waste, and remarks that sharing facilities 
for spent fuel and radiation waste man-
agement including disposal facilities, is a 
potentially beneficial option.
EURATOM is the regional mechanism 
for ensuring the highest standards of 
safety, security and non-proliferation 
in member states, and has a close liai-
son with the IAEA, operating as an IAEA 
agent. EURATOM has authority to deal 
with lack of conformity to the nuclear 
safety standards.
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Conclusion
In summary, the report of the UK Royal 
Society:
•	 describes the best practice;
•	  explains international realities of how 
things have changed in the nuclear 
industry;
•	  suggests viewing nuclear safety and 
security in terms of integrated risk 
management;
•	  proposes that independent and 
transparent regulation activities be 
set up;
•	  suggests that the fuel cycle should 
be managed from the ‘cradle to the 
grave’, in an international manage-
ment manner. 
The recommendations of the report 
should be considered for application in 
Africa. 
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David Nicolls, Eskom: 
(1)  With regard to non-proliferation risks, 
one of the key issues is to separate civil 
nuclear programmes from military nu-
clear programmes. What is the view of 
the United States (US), given that two 
of their civil nuclear plants are used for 
tritium production?
(2)  In terms of nuclear safety, it is interes-
ting to note that the US and European 
Union (EU) are opposed to internatio-
nal oversight of facilities, in the sense 
that they appear to view themselves 
as above the standards of the rest of 
the world. There is no external review 
of US and EU nuclear plants. 
(3)  It is widely known and accepted that 
the main problem with Fukushima was 
that the plant was built too low in the 
ground. 
Response, Ms Anne Harrington: 
(1)  The reactors mentioned belong to a 
government power-producing orga-
nisation, and the power goes to the ci-
vilian sector. As a G5 nation, the US has 
a responsibility to maintain a safe and 
secure stockpile. 
(2)  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
has finished its review of the safety ele-
ments of the many reactors that are 
functioning in the US. The Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission discovered that 
over time, the safety elements of the 
plants have been upgraded in ways 
that were not applied to plants in Ja-
pan. A better channel is needed for 
exchanging technical information on 
how to improve safety among opera-
tors of similar power plants all over the 
world.
Response, Dr Hideki Nariai: 
(3)  Research was done to estimate how 
high a tsunami could be and conclu-
ded that a possible tsunami wave 
would not exceed 2.5 m. The decision 
was taken to build a 10 m-high retaining 
sea wall. However, the recent tsunami 
constituted a convergence of waves 
that reached well over the height of 
the wall. Building on high ground is also 
a problem for various reasons. There 
are still many lessons to be learnt. 
Prof Rob Adam, Necsa: 
What does Mr Tshelane think the stumbling 
block would be in South Africa with regard 
to project readiness?
Response, Mr Phumzile Tshelane: 
A possible stumbling block to project readi-
ness in South Africa could be a bottleneck 
in terms of the regulatory aspects of the 
project. From the perspective of industry, 
challenges and bottlenecks may be ex-
perienced around localisation because 
of the problems with qualification of sup-
pliers. 
David Serfontein, North-West University: 
How many people have died and are 
Discussion: 
Selected Questions and Answers 
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expected to die as a result of the Fuku-
shima accident? One might assume that 
800 people would die as a result of Fuku-
shima over a 40-year period, or 20 people 
would die from cancer each year. How 
would this number of deaths from nuclear 
compare to deaths from other sources of 
energy, such as coal? It is possible that 
too much attention is paid to nuclear ac-
cidents in relation to other accidents?
Response, Prof Robert Guillaumont: 
It is difficult and may be not significant 
to compare the number of deaths resul-
ting from each of the sources of energy 
or types of energy generation. It is better 
to compare, in my opinion, the conse-
quences of accidents in terms of social 
impact. The social consequences of nu-
clear accidents with radioactive releases 
are very important. It is crucial that the 
containment of melted fuel be improved 
in the next generation nuclear reactors.
Ms Harrington: 
I agree that there has to be a more con-
certed effort on new reactor types. We 
have been working with Russia for some 
years on the high-temperature gas-cooled 
reactor, but the fundamental problem 
has been that despite feasibility studies 
and bringing our scientific communities 
together, at some point industry should 
support a specific design and join with the 
government to develop the design. How 
do you facilitate that linkage between 
government efforts to support the R&D and 
the partnership with industry?
Response, Prof Adam: 
One of the challenges is to recoup the 
investment on the Generation III reac-
tors that exist. The big vendors are despe-
rately trying to sell their current Generation 
III plants. Industry is not ready to begin the 
rollout of Generation IV reactors, even if 
there was a system to roll these out. What 
we see is the development of pilot plants 
in fast reactors and other systems, and 
when the time is right, Generation IV reac-
tors will be rolled out. Government should 
intervene where there is market failure. It 
is also necessary to understand that the 
process is very long. We are looking at 
multiples of human lifetimes in develop-
ing an energy strategy for the world that 
goes on for hundreds of years as opposed 
to tens of years. The systems can be de-
veloped, as long as there is a global pact 
between nations where this is accepted. 
This is not only a complex energy or physics 
problem, but also a complex international 
political problem to generate the required 
environment.
Response, Prof Guillaumont: 
Possibly the next step in nuclear energy 
could be the operation of fast reactors 
cooled with sodium. This would bring a 
drastic change in nuclear energy. The 
challenges is to find a new core for nu-
clear reactors that would be passive and 
to set up a new industrial nuclear fuel cy-
cle closed on plutonium multi-recycling, 
which is a difficult issue for many countries. 
There is research on this issue in France.
John Ledger, UJ: 
Much is said about the carbon footprint, 
but it appears that South Africa does not 
have enough coal to make carbon. A 
new paper by David Routledge in the 
International Journal of Coal Geology 
predicts a 90 per cent depletion of lo-
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cal coal reserves within the next 60 years. 
It is evident that nuclear is an alternative 
energy resource. 
Response, Prof Adam: 
I agree that it is not only a uranium scar-
city issue but also a coal scarcity issue. The 
question is whether we will have burnt too 
much by the time we run out of coal. This 
long-term resources issue could cause 
some of the investments in carbon se-
questration to become obsolete. There is 
nothing on the horizon to address this. 
Unknown person: 
Eskom is supposed to prepare the stake-
holder requirement specification (SRS), 
but how can Eskom act on behalf of other 
stakeholders?
Response, Prof Piet Stoker: 
Eskom is ultimately responsible for the safe-
ty of any nuclear plant to be constructed 
in South Africa. As part of this responsibi-
lity, Eskom must assume the challenge of 
ensuring that the system is safe on behalf 
of all stakeholders. If Eskom is to follow a 
systems engineering approach, it should 
consult stakeholders and be aware of their 
interests and needs, ensure that these are 
included in the SRS at the highest level, as 
well as ensure that the needs are fully met.
John Ledger, UJ: 
One of the stakeholders, the anti-nu-
clear movement in South Africa, does not 
abide by the rulebook and does not heed 
the referee. This movement has grown 
stronger with the arrival of Greenpeace 
in South Africa. How would the systems 
engineering approach deal with the anti-
nuclear movement and the possibility of 
the nuclear industry being taken to the 
Constitutional Court?
Response, Prof Stoker: 
Transparency and openness are essential. 
The facts must be made available to all.
Response, David Serfontein, 
North-West University: 
Legislation passed by the South African 
Parliament can be challenged based on 
the Constitution of this country. It would be 
reasonable to take the matter to the Con-
stitutional Court. 
Prof Adam: 
We already have the World Nuclear As-
sociation (WNA), which is a fairly repre-
sentative body, with representation gen-
erally at CEO level. Would you see that 
the WNA would play a role in the forum 
you suggest, or would you see an entirely 
different body being created? 
Response, Prof Roger Cashmore: 
The WNA is ‘lobbying’ for the nuclear in-
dustry. I chose the World Association of 
National Operators (WANO), because it 
has a clear responsibility for ensuring that 
there is a very high standard in operations 
of nuclear facilities, and the World Insti-
tute of Nuclear Security (WINS) because 
this is an upcoming, important body in 
nuclear security. I am sure there is cross-
membership between WNA, WANO and 
WINS. It is essential to have a body that 
conducts serious independent peer re-
view and publishes the results, ensuring 
implementation of the recommenda-
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tions of the peer reviews. They will give 
the industry, the countries and the public 
confidence that nuclear facilities are being 
well operated.
David Nicolls, Eskom: 
You mentioned the prospect of interna-
tional peer reviews for nuclear security. 
This implies that a foreign body reviews 
your security plan. I am a little concerned 
that this would be challenging, as most 
countries see security as a state security 
issue. I doubt whether the US would ac-
cept a South African team, for example, 
reviewing the security of a US nuclear fa-
cility. 
Response, Prof Cashmore: 
This is a civilian mechanism. It is in all our 
interests to make sure that nuclear facili-
ties are secure. South Africans may be a 
lot smarter at picking up nasty things that 
could happen to a reactor and it would 
be good, for example, if a South African 
team were to review US nuclear facilities. 
Unknown person: 
Have you contemplated private owner-
ship of reactors? Much has been said 
about government-owned facilities, but 
there is a move towards smaller reactors 
owned by large mining companies. How 
would the potential private ownership of 
reactors come into the security exercise?
Response, Prof Cashmore: 
This is an interesting question. Small reac-
tors will be developed in the future. All 
reactors in Britain are in private owner-
ship. A new wave of reactors to be built 
in Britain will be built by commercial activi-
ties, without government sponsorship. Busi-
ness will grow in terms of the small modular 
reactors, and these will be owned by pri-
vate companies. They take delivery of the 
whole system, and contract waste com-
panies to remove the spent fuel. This will 
become the standard commercial ap-
proach to energy production. This could 
be challenging, as it implies international 
trade and disposal activities. There will 
not be a problem with the ownership of 
the reactors, because the owners do not 
have an influence over how the reactors 
work. The reactors will merely be commer-
cially supplied power sources.
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Prof Crewe informed delegates that the 
idea of holding this symposium had be-
gun with the ASSAf commentary on the 
IRP 2010 requested by the Deputy Minister 
of Science and Technology. The idea de-
veloped during the meeting of the G8+5 
Academies of Science attended by Prof 
Crewe, at which international participa-
tion in this symposium was promised, ensu-
ring that the event would be distinct from 
other conferences on similar topics in 
South Africa. The international and local 
inputs to this symposium were very refresh-
ing, original and decisive in conveying 
specific and relevant points.
Ms Harrington spoke about disarmament 
and global threat-reduction in the context 
of a growing nuclear power industry and 
focused on a low carbon future, mentio-
ning various supporting frameworks such 
as International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) Peaceful Uses Initiative and the 
range of IAEA instruments. The role of 
the NNSA is to build partnerships and 
develop nuclear infrastructures. Ms Har-
rington maintained that South Africa was 
a nuclear security leader, based on the 
conversion of the South African Funda-
mental Atomic Research Installation re-
search reactor to low-enriched uranium, 
from which radioisotopes were produced 
for commercial purposes. The new focus 
of the National Nuclear Security Admin-
istration in South Africa was on nuclear 
forensics, uranium characterisation and 
analysis. South African technical expertise 
could be used to build regional capacity 
in this regard.
Mr Tshelane, of the Nuclear Industry As-
sociation of South Africa, explained that 
regulatory, finance, localisation, sche-
dules, skills and public acceptance were 
the main risks related to nuclear energy. 
He approached risks from the standpoint 
of industry, where the project risk was of 
key importance. He spoke about project 
risks and how to avoid them, particularly in 
terms of the government’s role in reducing 
the financial risk related to nuclear energy.
Dr Nariai, of the Science Council of Japan, 
described the causes and sequences of 
events at Fukushima, explaining that 78 
000 people had been evacuated and 
that the radiation levels had fallen to 1.7 
mSv/year at the site boundary. The evalu-
ation of the robustness of plants in facing 
external events, seismic safety and severe 
accidents, as well as the comprehensive 
investigation of the fundamental cause, 
was explained. It was interesting that 
one of the possible risks of the Fukushima 
Daiichi plants was that the installation by 
Westinghouse and General Electric had 
been a turnkey installation, and there had 
been minimal research and development 
(R&D) depth of understanding of the 
plants that were installed. It was important 
to feed new knowledge back into the op-
eration of the old plants, which required 
cooperation among various fields. In Dr 
Nariai’s view, Japanese high-tech com-
Summary and Way Forward
Prof Rob Adam, Necsa
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panies came to the rescue in dealing with 
the accident at Fukushima, and this tech-
nical resilience of Japan made disaster-
recovery possible. 
Prof Guillaumont, of the French Académie 
Des Sciences, gave an excellent descrip-
tion of current global regulatory systems, 
explaining which were national and which 
were international. He recommended that 
research on current reactors, disaster oc-
currence probabilities, radiology, and ac-
cident remediation should be boosted 
and in particular, life extension should be 
examined. Innovative research, including 
research into new materials, cladding, 
fuels, remote control and measurements, 
should also be enhanced. 
Prof Adam, of the South African Nuclear 
Energy Corporation, focused on the past, 
present and future scope of nuclear power, 
particularly in terms of fuel resources, pub-
lic engagement and new technology de-
velopment.
Prof Stoker, of the North-West University, 
presented a system’s approach to nucle-
ar energy safety. He described the IAEA’s 
role of providing guidelines rather than 
regulations and explained the ‘V’ model 
for baseline management, stating that 
validation could only be done after the 
start of operation. He recommended that 
safety should be baselined and formally 
contracted throughout the contracting 
chain, and that the Inter-organisational 
Nuclear Knowledge Management Sys-
tem should be applied in the South African 
new nuclear build, which would involve a 
range of South African organisations cur-
rently operating in the nuclear sphere.
Adv Mkhize, of the National Nuclear Reg-
ulator, explained the role of regulatory 
authorities in future nuclear energy safety 
development, claiming that a clean re-
cord tended to be destroyed by a single 
lapse. He explained the various roles of a 
regulator: 
•	  Promotional: based on organisations’ 
values and behaviours.
•	  Corrective: providing guidance and 
support.
•	  Adjudicative: providing decisive inter-
vention in the interests of safety. 
He also described the global safety re-
gime and its range of conventions, the 
safety reassessment and post-Fukushima 
stress testing that was being undertaken 
in all reactors around the world. 
Dr Tsela, of Mzansi Energy Solutions and 
Innovations, masqueraded as the com-
mon man, assuring delegates that the 
public could no longer be ignored. He 
looked into the public acceptance of 
nuclear over the past ten years and as-
serted that Fukushima had not had a ma-
jor impact on public opinion concerning 
nuclear power. The democratic legitima-
cy, ease of decision-making, and making 
the right choice to demystify nuclear, 
were other matters referred to in his pre-
sentation. It was necessary to:
•	  understand what the big public idea 
of nuclear was based on in order to 
supersede that idea, and focus on the 
benefits of nuclear energy rather that 
explaining its technicalities;
•	  engage with concepts that were in 
the consumer space and accept that 
the public was indeed rational.
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Prof Cashmore, of the UK Royal Society, 
presented his talk only hours after the 
launch of the report, Responsible Steward-
ship of a Nuclear Renaissance: Best Prac-
tice for Non-Proliferation. He explained 
various key points of the report:
•	  Global governance that does not 
reflect the international reality of the 
nuclear industry.
•	  Recommendations that the Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer of the World Nuclear 
Forum should engage with govern-
ments.
•	  There was no time for complacency, 
as demonstrated by the attention to 
nuclear safety post-Fukushima, and 
avoiding complacency was vital to 
maintaining confidence in the nuclear 
renaissance. 
•	  An integrated approach to safety and 
security, risk assessment and manage-
ment should feature more prominently 
at all levels of decision-making, from 
the design and regulation, to corpo-
rate governance of nuclear organisa-
tions. 
•	  The ability to safeguard nuclear ener-
gy remained an R&D priority. 
•	  The dual risk of nuclear materials and 
technology being used in several mili-
tary applications could not be elimi-
nated.
•	  Strategic planning, from cradle-to- 
grave, is essential. 
•	  The management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste should no longer 
be an afterthought, and the entire fuel 
cycle would have to be considered. 
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Prof Diab thanked the international guests in particular for their 
participation, as well as the organisations that had assisted with 
the delegates’ travel, making specific mention of the French 
and Japanese Embassies in South Africa. The local speakers 
and the audience were thanked for their contributions to the 
interesting and engaging discussions. The staff members of the 
Academy were commended on the efficient organisation of 
the symposium. 
Concluding Remarks 
and Vote of Thanks
Prof Roseanne Diab, Executive Officer, ASSAf 
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Appendices
Appendix 1 - Symposium Programme 
“Nuclear Energy Safety ” Symposium
Thursday, 13 October 2011
08:45 – 16:30 
Innovation Hub, Pretoria 
Agenda 
08:45 – 09:15 Registration 
Chair: Prof Robin Crewe
President, ASSAf
Time Topic Speaker
09:15 – 09:20 Welcome and purpose Prof Robin CrewePresident, ASSAf
09:20 – 09:50 Keynote address Honourable Minister of Energy,  Ms Dipuo Peters  
09:50 – 10:20
Disarmament and global 
threat reduction in the 
context of a growing 
nuclear power industry
Ms Anne Harrington 
US Department of Energy Office of 
Science
10:20 – 10:35 Discussion
10:35 – 10:55 Nuclear energy – understanding the risks
Mr Phumzile Tshelane
Nuclear Industry Association of South 
Africa (NIASA) 
10:55 – 11:10 Discussion 
11:10 - 11:30 Tea
Chair: Prof Himla Soodyall  
ASSAf
11:30 – 12:00 Lessons Learned – Fukushima, Japan 
Dr Hideki Nariai
Science Council of Japan
12:00 – 12:15 Discussion
12:15 – 12:45
Challenges and 
opportunities for 
enhancing the safety 
standards in the nuclear 
industry  
Prof Robert Guillaumont
Académie des Sciences, Institut de 
France
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12:45 – 13:00 Discussion
13:00 – 13:20
Challenges and 
opportunities for 
enhancing the 
development of 
safer nuclear energy 
technologies 
Prof Rob Adam 
Necsa
13:20 – 13:30 Discussion 
13:30 – 14:15 Lunch 
Chair: Dr Van Zyl de Villiers 
14:15 – 14:35 Nuclear Energy Safety: A Systems Approach
Prof Piet Stoker 
North-West University
14:35 – 14:45 Discussion
14:45 – 15:05
The role of regulatory 
authorities in future 
nuclear energy safety 
development 
Advocate Boyce Mkhize
National Nuclear Regulator
15:05 – 15:15 Discussion 
15:15 – 15:35
Public engagement and 
perception of nuclear 
energy and associated 
risks 
Dr Alex Tsela 
Mzansi Energy Solutions 
15:35 – 15:45 Discussion 
15:45 – 16:15
Presentation on the 
Royal Society Report: 
‘Responsible stewardship 
of a nuclear renaissance: 
best practice for non-
proliferation’
Prof Roger Cashmore (via 
videoconference) 
UK Royal Society
16:15 – 16:30 Discussion 
16:15 – 16:25 Summary and way forward Prof Rob Adam 
16:25 – 16:30 Concluding remarks and vote of thanks Prof Roseanne Diab
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Appendix 2 - Biographies of Speakers 
Professor Rob Adam is Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa), South Africa’s 
statutory nuclear technology organisation. He has held this 
position since 2006. He holds the title of Extraordinary Profes-
sor of Physics at both the University of Pretoria and the Uni-
versity of South Africa. Prof Adam also serves on the Council 
of the Academy of Science of South Africa, on the Board of 
Pebble-bed Modular Reactor (Pty) Ltd and chairs the Steering 
Committee for South Africa’s bid to host the Square Kilome-
tre Array Radio Telescope. Before joining NECSA, Adam was 
Director-General of the Department of Science and Technol-
ogy, a position he held for seven years. In this capacity he 
was responsible for driving all major national science and 
technology initiatives of Government. Adam has held various 
academic positions in Europe and South Africa, and has pub-
lished 25 refereed articles in theoretical physics.
Professor Roger Cashmore is the Principal of Brasenose Col-
lege at Oxford University. He is a former Director of Research 
and Deputy Director-General of the European Organisation 
for Nuclear Research (CERN) where he was responsible for the 
experimental programme at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). 
Currently his research interests focus on the LHC, using the Atlas 
Detector in which Oxford University is involved, and the search 
for dark matter in underground experiments. He is Chairman of 
the Ministry of Defence’s Nuclear Research Advisory Council 
and member of the Royal Society’s Advisory Committee on the 
Scientific Aspects of International Security (SAIS).
Professor Robert Guillaumont is an Emeritus Professor of 
Chemistry at the Université Paris-Sud in Orsay. His scientific 
background is around radiochemistry and actinides chemis-
try and his expertise is on the chemistry of nuclear fuel cycle 
(from uranium mining to waste management through repro-
cessing). He got his PhD from the Radium Institute (Paris). He 
has been appointed as Member or as the Head for many 
French and International Committees dealing with Nuclear 
Energy, Radwaste (Radioactive waste) Management (re-
search and Safety) and the use of radionuclides. Today he 
belongs to the French Nuclear Safety Committee in charge 
of Radwastes and he is a member of the French Academy 
of Sciences.  
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Ms Anne Harrington was sworn in as Deputy Administrator for 
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation for the National Nuclear 
Security Administration in October 2010. Previously, she was 
the Director of the US National Academy of Sciences Com-
mittee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), a 
position she held from March 2005 to October 2010.  While 
at CISAC, she managed several key studies on a variety of 
nonproliferation, threat reduction and other nuclear security 
issues, including: Global Security Engagement: A New Model 
for Cooperative Threat Reduction (2009); Future of the Nuclear 
Security Environment in 2015 (2009); Internationalisation of the 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Stra-tegies, and Challenges (2008, 
joint report with Russian Academy of Sciences).  Harrington 
served for 15 years in the US Department of State, where she 
was Acting Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Prolif-
eration Threat Reduction and a senior US government expert 
on nonproliferation and cooperative threat reduction. She 
has dedicated much of her government career to develop-
ing policy and implementing programmes aimed at prevent-
ing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and missile expertise in Russia and Eurasia, and also launched 
similar efforts Iraq and Libya. Harrington has been author or 
co-author on a number of papers on the role of the scientific 
community in preventing proliferation of WMD expertise and 
approaches to countering biological threats.
Advocate Boyce Mkhize is currently the Chief Executive Offi-
cer of the National Nuclear Regulator (NNR). Boyce is a lawyer 
by training possessing B.Juris and LLB degrees from the Univer-
sity of Zululand and an admitted Advocate of the High Court 
of South Africa. Prior to him joining the NNR in 2010, he was the 
Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the Health Professions 
Council of South Africa (HPCSA). While CEO of the HPCSA, 
Boyce also served as the Secretary-General of the Association 
for Medical Councils of Africa. He also served as Chief Legal 
Advisor and Company Secretary for the then Atomic Energy 
Corporation, now known as the South African Nuclear Energy 
Corporation (NECSA). Prior to this he had served in Government 
Departments in various capacities which included being Chief 
of Staff in the office of the Minister of Public Service and Admin-
istration and Deputy Director for Affirmative Action Policy and 
Transformation. Boyce also serves in Boards and Councils of a 
few public institutions and private companies in South Africa.
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Dr Hideki Nariai is the former President of the Japan Nuclear 
Energy Safety Organisation (2003 – 2009), following a brief pe-
riod as the President of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan. 
He graduated from the University of Tokyo, where he obtained 
a doctorate in Engineering. He then joined the Ship Research 
Institute as a research engineer for the Nuclear Ship Division 
from 1967 - 1980. Nariai spent a year at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology as a visiting Engineer at the Depart-
ment of Mechanical Engineering. He was then appointed as 
Associate Professor, Professor and thereafter Emeritus Profes-
sor at the University of Tsukuba, Japan. Nariai’s key interest 
areas are nuclear thermal hydraulics and nuclear safety. He 
is a member of the Science Council of Japan.     
Professor Piet Stoker joined the North-West University in 2005 as 
Head of the Centre for Research and Continued Engineering 
Development (Vaal). He has since built up a research group 
comprising 15 PhD and 4 Master students working in the area 
of: “nuclear policy and business studies”. Prior to this Stoker 
worked in the Mining, Utilities and Arms Development indus-
tries as consultant. He was CEO of MEGKON (Pty) Ltd, a tech-
nology development company, for a period of 20 years.  Dur-
ing this time the company grew to an international enterprise, 
and won the Technology Top 100 category award five times. 
He served on the South African Council of Professional Engi-
neers (the predecessor of Engineering Council of South Africa 
from 1983 to 1988 and he has been a registered Professional 
Engineer since 1978.  
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Dr Alex Tsela is the Chief Executive Officer of Mzanzi Energy 
Solutions and Innovations. He has held several strategic roles 
in the past. Amongst others, Dr Tsela was the Chief Executive 
Officer of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor Company, the 
General Manager of the Nuclear Compliance Assurance, 
and on the Board of Directors in the Nuclear Industry Associa-
tion of South Africa (NIASA). He was interim CEO, after being 
the Head of Regulatory Strategy and a Radiation Protection 
Specialist, at the National Nuclear Regulator of South Africa. 
His focus areas were on leading research and development, 
safety standards and regulations, international liaison. Prior to 
this he was a lecturer in physics at the University of the Wit-
watersrand and University of Swaziland. He holds a PhD in 
Nuclear Physics from the University of the Witwatersrand, MSc 
Nuclear physics from the University of Sussex and an MBA from 
the University of Pretoria. 
Mr Phumzile Tshelane is the Vice-President of the Nuclear 
Industry Association of South Africa (NIASA). He is currently 
employed full time by Eskom, where he participates in the 
development of execution plans for the Eskom nuclear 
build programme. He is also the non-executive Director at 
the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa). In 
the past 20 years, he has served in several national and 
international organisations and he has proven excellence 
as a technology strategist.
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